FACTOR 3

THE DIMENSIONALITY OF NATIONS PROJECT

AD724329

FACTOR 2

RESEARCH REPORT

FACTOR 1

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII

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The Dimensionality of Nations Project
Department of Political Science
University of Hawaii

RESEARCH REPORT NO. 52

TESTING SOME HYPOTHESES ABOUT DELEGATE ATTITUDES
AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOME
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY BUILDING

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April 1971

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1 ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)	2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
DIMENSIONALITY OF NATIONS PROJECT	UNCLASSIFIED
	2b. GROUP

3 REPORT TITLE

TESTING SOME HYPOTHESES ABOUT DELEGATE ATTITUDES AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY BUILDING.

4 DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)
RESEARCH REPORT NO. 52

5 AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

VINCENT, Jack E.

6 REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO OF PAGES	7b NO OF REFS
APRIL 1, 71	83	

8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
N00014-67-A-0387-0003	RESEARCH REPORT NO. 52
b. PROJECT NO	
c.	9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)
d.	

10 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

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11 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12 SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
2500 Campus Road Honolulu, Hawaii 96822	Advanced Research Projects Agency Washington, D.C.

13 ABSTRACT

When United Nations delegates were asked to mark a questionnaire probing matters concerning the United Nations system and international affairs, different behavioral patterns emerged within a cooperative group of delegates. For the most part, delegates generally seem "positive" in regard to both their wishes and perceptions. When the questionnaire scores were related to the predictors (factors calculated from attributes concerning the respondents' home states) two factors assumed superior predictive power: "Development" and "Authoritarianism." High scores in both cases were related to negative questionnaire responses. This finding reinforces the importance of "Development" as a predictor of U.N. delegate attitudes, and suggest that another factor, "Authoritarianism," may also be of some importance. These findings also appear to have considerable relevance for notions developed under the concepts of Attribute and Social Field Theory.

KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
Attitudes						
United Nations						
Underdeveloped						
Developed						
Factor Analysis						
Canonical Correlation						
Attribute Theory						
Field Theory						
Delegates						
General Assembly						

TESTING SOME HYPOTHESES ABOUT DELEGATE ATTITUDES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY BUILDING[1]

This study examines United Nations delegate attitudes about a number
of matters concerning the United Nations and the international system. It
attempts to ascertain what relationships, if any, can be found between
delegate attitudinal patterns and the characteristics of their home states.
It is a complement of a previous study entitled, "National Attributes as
Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations."[2] The principal
difference between the two studies is that the former limited itself to an
examination of organ-related attitudes, such as concerning the voting system
of the Security Council, while the present one probes attitudes that are
more general and philosophical in character. A comparison of results will
be given later.

The importance of delegate attitudes to the development of the United
Nations calls for elaboration and theoretical development. In general, it
can be assumed that delegates possess "influence potential" because of the
kind of role they play in the United Nations setting. Richard F. Pederson
has pointed out:

> Other characteristics of the U.N. which uniquely influence
> negotiations include the fact that all U.N. negotiation is in effect
> multilateral, as is also the openness of U.N. activity, e.g., the
> fact that at any moment any one of the negotiators may make a public
> test of negotiating strengths by taking an issue out of private talks
> and into the public forum...They [the delegates] have a large measure
> of discretion in tactics...There are exceptional cases when issues
> must be decided immediately and U.N. delegations are compelled to
> vote without instructions from their governments; such votes may
> establish governmental policy...a U.N. delegation in its advisory
> capacity may exert significant influence on national policy...Some
> delegations, in fact, receive only general instructions, allowing
> them the latitude to make many decisions themselves...Information
> and the consequent assessment of it by delegations are often crucial
> elements in final governmental policy decisions.[3]

In short, delegates: (1) sometimes make decisions without directions from their home governments, (2) supply information to their home governments, and hence this personal opinion is probably reflected in this intelligence, (3) are frequently asked for their advice when home governments compile instructions. For these reasons the assumption of "influence potential" on the part of delegates seems to be a reasonable one.[4]

The following diagram, as a kind of conceptual scheme, may help illuminate the present project and indicate some paths of possible future research.

FIGURE A

The above figure, then, may be thought of as a simplified model relating to delegate influence and action at the United Nations, as well as a possible program of systematic study.[5] Beginning on the left of the model, it suggests that an important ingredient in delegate action relates to home government instructions. Clearly, when instructions are compelling and specific, the delegate is basically a creature of his home government.[6]

As the above quotation from Pederson indicates, however, home governments frequently allow delegates considerable latitude. This is supported by Alker and Russett who have pointed out:

> The usual mechanism for transmitting...policies into resolutions, speeches, and votes in the Assembly is the diplomatic communication from the national foreign offices. When a delegate is not specifically advised...he relies on more general instructions, his own personal initiatives and obligations, and a number of national, regional, and caucusing group loyalties and attitudes. Some idea of the degree of personal freedom exercised by the diplomats themselves can be obtained on an impressionistic basis by interviewing them...The specific influence of personal interpretations and national instructions on each of the issues in the Assembly is, however, difficult to uncover systematically as is the content of each diplomat's official correspondence.[7]

Going back to the model, there are a number of acts that a delegate must engage in that are little conditioned by his attitudes, that is, those acts the delegate must perform when he is following specific and compelling instructions. In the model these are designated as "prescribed" acts and are shown as emerging from the delegate without going through the "zone of attitudes."[8]

As indicated above, however, not all instructions are specific and compelling. Many instructions may be of a more general character, allowing considerable delegate interpretation and freedom in respect to application. Acts related to such instructions are viewed as falling in the "semi-prescribed" category. A delegate probably can't completely flaunt the intention of the general instructions but their application in a concrete case is assumed to be influenced by his feelings, perceptions, etc.

Finally, we have a range of delegate activity which we might call "unprescribed" in the sense that the delegate is given no instructions - general or otherwise - for this kind of activity. This is not to say that the delegate can do anything that he wants in such activity areas. he. like everyone else, is hemmed in by a variety of social and cultural restraints. Rather, it is simply to indicate, for the sake of the model's completeness, that there may be a number of delegate acts for which instructions are irrelevant. Again, we assume, for such activities, that the delegate's personal attitudes will have a considerable bearing on his action.

The flow, - instructions→delegate→action - however, is complicated by the fact that the delegate himself is a source of information for the home government and this information may be used in the formulation of instructions. This circuitous flow of causality is indicated in the model through the 'information arrow" pointing back at the home government. Thus, even though instructions that are specific and compelling are depicted as "going around"

delegate attitudes during their translation into action, in the sense that the delegate presumably must engage in prescribed acts on the receipt of such instructions, nevertheless the information upon which those instructions were formulated may have come in great measure from the delegate himself. Thus, delegate attitudes may "stand behind" or influence even specific and compelling instructions.

The summation of all delegate acts, prescribed, semi-prescribed, and unprescribed, together, equal, in the model, United Nations activity. That is U.N. outcomes, such as budgets, resolutions, conferences, etc., are viewed as the end product of delegate acts. Non-delegate personnel, in this formulation, are assumed to perform roles supportive of such acts, i.e., secretariat personnel are assumed to implement the various goals that are articulated by delegate acts, although some others are given, of course, by the Charter and gentleman's agreements between states. Such U.N. outcomes, in turn, are assumed to have international relations impact. That is, United Nations outcomes may have international relations consequences in the sense that relationships and activity between states are altered as a result of such outcomes. Home governments, of course, anticipate and react to such U.N. outcomes and this is indicated by the arrow from international relations impact back to home government. Again, the potential relevance of delegate attitudes is made clear if it is agreed that at least a portion of United Nations activity may be derived from semi-prescribed and unprescribed acts which help fashion these outcomes (and even the prescribed acts, if delegate attitudes are assumed to "stand behind" some specific and compelling home government instructions). Also, of course, even instructions that are formulated without reference to delegate information, but in terms of anticipated and actual U.N. outcomes, may have relevance to delegate attitudes, to the extent such attitudes helped shape U.N. outcomes.

Besides suggesting possible causal links between attitudes, action, outcomes, and impact, the model also suggests many potentially fruitful areas of inquiry. Concerning instructions, numerous questions can be raised. What is the ratio of "specific and compelling" instructions to "general instructions" when the delegates are considered as a whole? What predictors are relevant to the frequency and magnitude of instructions?[9] Do the instructions of delegates from authoritarian states tend to be more specific and compelling than the instructions of delegates from democratic states?

Similar probes can be envisioned in respect to information. Do the delegates from developed states send more information back to their home governments than delegates from underdeveloped states? Can we predict the priorities home governments will assign to delegate information, as opposed to other kinds of information, when they are formulating their instructions to delegates?

Turning to the action side of the figure, additional explorations are suggested. For example, a difficult but possibly very important research problem would be to attempt to classify all kinds of acts engaged in by U.N. delegates and then try to establish some sort of observational test to determine whether certain kinds of acts are more important for U.N. activities and functions than other kinds of acts. That is, delegates may be conceived of engaging in almost the entire range of human activity, such as dancing, social, voting, official, playing tennis, recreational, etc., and the difficulties in sorting out the kinds of acts that should be focused upon in research should not be underestimated, i.e., certain social acts may have considerably relevance. In this connection there may be some way of determining the relative predictive importance of "prescribed" as

opposed to "semi-prescribed" and "unprescribed acts" in such areas as budgetary contributions, charter amendments, etc. In short, the above model suggests several areas where additional research might be conducted to establish a solid foundation for assessing the character and importance of delegate impact at the United Nations.

As a pilot project, this study cannot hope to touch on all of these research possibilities at once. It should be clear that the primary focus is upon uncovering some delegate attitudes[10] and the problem of assessing the predictive relevance, in respect to these attitudes, of a certain category of potential relevant predictors, viewed as "national attributes." (The notion of "attribute theory" will be developed later). That is, the study asks the question, "Can we predict delegate attitudes on various matters in terms of the kinds of states from which the delegates are derived?" This exploration should be considered important because of the potential relevance, explained above, of delegate attitudes to United Nations activity and international relations. National attirbutes, as predictors, are chosen in part because of their "accessibility." In the long run, other, less easily obtainable predictors may also have relevance, in the sense of accounting for more of the variance observed in attitudes. In this author's opinion numerous explorations along these lines should be made.

Questionnaire Construction

The delegates were asked to react to a number of statements about the United Nations and international affairs. Each item was assumed to relate to delegate "wishes" (values) or to delegate "perceptions" (cognition). The distinction between wishes and perceptual items was established by asking 43 non-delegate judges[11] to sort a pool of items into two categories,

labeled "wish statements" and "perception statements," respectively. Only those items upon which there was 90%+ agreement, in the sense that they fell into one category or the other, were used in the analysis.

The items chosen labeled as "wish statements" were:

1. It seems desirable to give the United Nations some limited taxing powers.

2. It is desirable to give the United Nations, under suitable conditions, a permanent international military force.

3. It would be desirable to amend the Charter to give the International Court of Justice absolute compulsory jurisdiction over certain categories of cases.

4. Advisory opinions of the International Court should be respected almost as if they were decisions.

5. If the world is to disarm, it is desirable to give the U.N. major responsibility rather than some agnecy outside of the U.S. system.

6. The United Nations needs to be strengthened in almost all aspects.

7. It is desirable to place the remaining non-self governing territories more firmly under the control of the U.N.

8. Members of the Secretariat should be selected solely on merit (no geographic considerations).

9. Each member state should decide for itself, in terms of its interests, the meaning of the Charter.

10. States should generally follow their "national interest" as they pursue policies at the U.N.

11. It is generally preferable to pursue one's "national interest" instead of "moral values" if they come into conflict.

The items chosen labeled as "perceptual statements" were:

1. The United Nations environment tends to make a person less nationalistic.

2. It is very doubtful the United Nations will evolve into a world government.

3. Suppressing the quest to achieve "national interests" would generally benefit the United Nations.

4. It is clear that members of the Secretariat, including the Secretary General, can rise above national and regional interests to become truly international persons.

5. The United Nations seems to have contributed significantly to reducing conflict in the modern world.

6. If large scale war were to occur between major power, the United Nations would be of little use in controlling the conflict.

7. The United Nations seems to have more influence on world affairs than it did 5 to 10 years ago.

8. There are few international problems that the U.N., in its present form, is not capable of solving, if a real effort is made to use its facilities.

9. States apparently can openly defy the United Nations with little loss of international status.

10. Most states pay careful attention to United Nations resolutions in formulating their policies.

11. Moral values do play a large role in the activities at the United Nations.

12. Conflict seems to be the normal state of affairs in international relations.

13. To expect "world peace" in the near future, in the sense of man living harmoniously and cooperatively with man, is basically utopian.

14. The national state system in many ways seems outmoded.

Regarding "wish" items, the judges were asked, in their opinion, to decide "which, if granted, would further the interests and development (benefit) the United Nations system, and which, if granted, would be disbeneficial to the system." There was 90%+ agreement that "wishes" 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 7, fall in the benefit category, and "wishes" 9, 10, and 11, fall into the disbenefit category.

```
+----------------------------------------+
|  To mark here means you can neither    |
|                                        |
|  agree nor disagree with the statement.|
+----------------------------------------+
```

Highly   Moderately   Slightly | Slightly   Moderately   Highly
                                 ↓
Agree────────────────────────────0──────────────────────────────Disagree*

*The answer line has been expanded here for explanatory convenience.

Naturally, you can mark anywhere on the answer line. The major

idea is that agreement, or disagreement, increases as you move

away from the "0" on the answer line. We understand that you may

hold certain reservations or qualifications in mind in marking a

particular answer line. What we want is your general impression

of the statement.

They were also told:

The results of the study will be used solely for academic

purposes. (In any published results,it will not be possible to

identify those that help us, either by person or nation).

Scores were initially generated from the answer line by dividing it

into 21 parts with magnitude increasing moving from "Agree" to "Disagree"

with "0" scored as 11. Employing such a system, the following possible

marks produce the following kinds of scores:

Agree┤   3   6   9   11   13   16   18   21Disagree
     +─────+─────+─────+───────────+─────+───────+─────+

On every item, the range of delegate marks was from 1 to 21.

Data Collection

Data was collected from March 1965 through January 1966. Initially, questionnaires were sent to all Ambassadors of Permanent Missions.[13] Ambassadors were asked to complete the questionnaire, but were also told:

If you choose, you may have anyone in your delegation who is competent complete the questionnaire. We do not need to know the personal identity of those who participate. It should be clear that the project has no ideological or political purpose.

Identification cards enclosed with some of the questionnaires indicate that at least 15 of the responding delegates were actually Ambassadors.[14] United Nations delegates are naturally reluctant to engage in any act which might reflect unfavorably on their country. For this reason, it is difficult to obtain a satisfactory harvest of questionnaire data. Sixty-five delegates did cooperate, however, and they tend to distribute well, in terms of the characteristics of their home states, across a number of categories of potential analytical concern.

TABLE I[15]

Chi-square indicates that the frequency distributions of these ways of subdividing the sample are not significantly different from those in the universe, operating at the .05 level. If this held for all of the predictor variables considered in this study, the sample could be said to be unbiased in respect to the predictors (i.e., big states are not overrepresented, etc.). This approach, however, does not get at the problem of another kind of bias. Thus, the delegates who answered the questionnaire might be generally more "positive" (or negative) than the delegates that refused to answer the questionnaire or, just "different" in their response patterns.

That is, the cooperative and non-cooperative delegates may constitute
two different "populations," in respect to their responses to the questionnaire.
Concerning the problem of bias, Zetterberg has argued:

> The relationships expressed in the theoretical
> propositions, in other words, claim to be universally
> present. They are, accordingly, present in represen-
> tative and non-representative samples. To disprove or
> demonstrate their existence is, hence, possible in any
> kind of sample - biased or unbiased. This important,
> and perhaps surprising, consideration, however, should
> immediately be qualified. When using a biased sample
> for a verification, we must have assurance that the
> relationship we want to prove is not introduced into
> our data by selective sampling. This possibility,
> however, is, in most cases, rather unlikely...On balance,
> it appears that non-representative samples are not much
> inferior to representative samples when we want to
> disprove a theoretical hypothesis.[16]

This being the case, if it is assumed that delegate responses are
not related to cooperation, the tests of significance employed in this
study might be viewed as applying as if the sample were random. If this
assumption is deemed unwarranted, they apply only to the cooperative
universe, i.e., apply to chance associations of the marks on the question-
naire to the predictors in respect to the cooperative delegates. Sampling
variability in the first case refers to the population of all possible
delegate responses, while in the second case it refers to the population
of cooperative delegate responses.

To be more specific, if a certain "significant" correlation is
found, say, between "economic development" and "wish" to give the U.N.
taxing power, the correlation might be viewed as applying to a sample of the
population of the cooperative universe (i.e., in the cooperative universe
the "true" correlation is probably not zero) or to a sample of the universe
of all delegates (i.e., in the entire universe of delegates the "true"
correlation is probably not zero). In either case, the association could
be the result of chance and the level significance, of course, "gives the odds."

If one wishes to ignore the problem of sampling variability, then
all correlations can be viewed as equally important, in the sense of
accurately describing the degree of association between the predictors
and the questionnarie items for the cooperative delegates. The considerable
size of the cooperative group (representing over half of the delegations)
is deemed to make purely descriptive discussion of it quite meaningful.

Findings (Means and Standard Deviations)

The overall results, in terms of means and standard deviations, are
summarized in the following table.

TABLE II

The table indicates the fiducial limits (.05 level) of the population,
calculated from the standard error. Remembering the previous discussion of
the two ways the sample can be viewed, these limits might be viewed as
applying to the cooperative delegates or to all delegates. In the former
case, we would expect, in 95 out of 100 samples, that the mean value of
the coopetative delegates would fall within these limits. In the latter
case, we would expect, 95 chances out of 100, that the all delegate means
fall within these limits. Thus, on Item 1 we would expect the all delegate
mean to fall between 11.3 and 14.8.

Descriptively, the means show the general sentiment of the cooperative
delegates on the items, and the standard deviation indicates the degree of
dispersion. Thus, delegates tend to disagree that the United Nations should
be given some limited taxing powers, but they tend to agree that the United
Nations needs to be strengthened in almost all aspects; and, examining the
standard deviations, there seems to be more consensus on the latter question
than on the former.

The overall results in regard to "wishes" may be summarized as
follows: Delegates tend to agree that: (1) the United Nations should
have a permanent military force, (2) the International Court of Justice
should be given compulsory jurisdiction over certain categories of cases,
(3) the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice should be
respected as if they were decisions, (4) the United Nations should be given
major responsibility for disarmament, (5) the United Nations needs to be
strengthened in almost all aspects, (6) the non-self governing territories
should be placed more firmly under control of the U.N., and (7) states should
generally follow their national interests as they pursue policies at the
United Nations; but disagree that: (1) it is desirable to give the United
Nations some limited taxing power, (2) members of the Secretariat should be
selected solely on merit, (3) each member state should decide for itself,
in terms of its interests, the meaning of the Charter, and (4) it is
generally preferable to pursue one's national interests instead of moral
values, if they come into conflict.

Thus, generally speaking, the delegates tend to be on the "positive"
side in respect to "wishes." Only on two items, relating to taxing powers
and selection of members of the Secretariat, do the delegates come down on
the "negative wishes" side as defined by the judges. It should be noted
that on some items the delegates are strongly in agreement, such as on
items 5 and 6, whereas on other items they come close to hitting the
neutral point (11), as on items 1 and 11. Thus, on these two negative
"wishes" the degree of disagreement is quite modest, and in the case of
item 11, the fiducial limit extends into the "agreement zone."

Concerning "perceptions" the delegates tend to agree that: (1) the
United Nations environment tends to make a person less nationalistic,

(2) it is doubtful that the United Nations will evolve into a world
government, (3) suppressing the quest to achieve national interests would
generally benefit the United Nations, (4) members of the Secretariat,
including the Secretary General, can rise above national and regional
interests, (5) the United Nations seems to have contributed significantly
to reducing conflict in the modern world, (6) if large scale war were to
occur between the major powers, the United Nations would be of little use
in controlling the conflict, (7) the United Nations has more influence
on world affairs than it did 5 to 10 years ago, (8) there are few problems
that the U.N. is not capable of solving, (9) states **can openly defy the**
U.N. with little loss of international status, (10) most states pay careful
attention to U.N. resolutions in formulating their policies, (11) moral
values do play a large role in the activities at the United Nations,
(12) conflict seems to be the normal state of affairs in international
relations, (13) the national state system in many ways seems outmoded;
and, disagree that: (1) to expect world peace in the near future is
basically utopian.

Again, the strength of the agreement varies from question to question,
and on some items, such as 13, the mean falls only one unit of measurement
off the neutral point. On other items, such as 5 and 6, the average degree
of agreement appears quite strong. The delegates again seem to be on the
"positive" side, for the most part, remembering the evaluation of the judges.
Only on the items concerning world government, the use of the United Nations
in large scale war, the effect of defying the United Nations, and the
normality of conflict, do the delegates' perceptions appear "negative."

In general, then, both in terms of their "wishes" and their "perceptions'
United Nations delegates tend to be "positive" in the sense of having "wishes'

which, if fulfilled, would tend to benefit the United Nations, and having 'perceptions" which, if accurate, indicate situations and tendencies favorable to the United Nations. Our first major finding, then, is that delegates, generally, seem to "stand behind" the extension of U.N. functions and certain developments that would seem to benefit the U.N. and that the delegates, generally, seem to see certain situations and developments favorable to the U.N. system.

As pointed out earlier, however, delegate responses tend to range all the way across the entire answer line. The question then arises: What kinds of delegates, in terms of the attributes of their home states, tend to mark the negative sides of the answer lines, and what kinds of delegates tend to mark the positive sides?

Possible Predictors of Attitude Scores

As indicated earlier, it is apparent that attitude scores might be related to a wide variety of potential predictors. For example, they might be related to the philosophical orientation or religious training of the respondents, or perhaps to certain personal experiences of the delegates at the United Nations. It was decided, however, as one potentially fruitful line of inquiry, to concentrate on variables related to the respondents' home states. That is, is it possible, knowing things about a respondent's home state, to predict his probable questionnaire response pattern?

Thirty-four possible predictors considered were taken from A Cross Polity Survey.[17] Fourteen additional predictors were taken from other sources. All variables considered are given in Table III and will not be repeated here.

Because the predictors have confusing interrelationships, and
because of their large number, they were factor analyzed.[18] Factor analysis
is generally considered a useful research tool because it can reduce a large
number of variables to a smaller number of factors with little loss of
information. Lach factor, using methods explained below, has the desirable
characteristic of being orthogonal to every factor in the analysis. This
means that "factor scores" [19] calculated from factor loadings on one factor
have zero correlations with factor scores calculated from all other factors.
Thus, confusing interrelationships between original variables are eliminated
through the technique of factor analysis, and, when a particular factor
dimension is being discussed, we know that it is a "unique dimension" which
does not overlap with other dimensions. In short, factor analysis shows
how variables are related to orthogonal linear dimensions cutting through
the data and how many such dimensions are needed to account for the bulk of
the original variance.

To accomplish the factor analysis, each respondent's state was coded
on the first 34 variables in terms suggested by the Cross Polity Survey.
For example, in respect to the variable of population, Banks and Textor
given four gradations: very large (100 million and above), large (17-99.9
million), medium (6-16.9 million), and small (under 6 million). Respondents'
states falling in the very large category were coded 1, those in the large
category, 2, and so forth. Rank numbers were then assigned to each state
on each variable following procedures similar to those outlined by Alker
and Russett in World Politics and the General Assembly.[20] Thus, all rank
numbers ranged from 1 to 65, with the average rank scores assigned in case
of ties. The rank numbers for the rest of the variables were based on
cardinal magnitude, i.e., the number of ICO memberships, except for Alliance,

which was originally coded 1 = U.S. ally, 2 = neutral, 3 = U.S.S.R. ally.
Once rank numbers were determined, all possible correlations between the
variables were calculated and the resulting intercorrelation matrix was
factor analyzed. The original 48 variables reduced to 11 factors (rotated)
accounting for 83% of the total original variance. The results are given
in the table below and, with each factor, the kind of characteristics
necessary to produce high factor scores are indicated.

TABLE III

Those possessing the highest factor scores tend to possess the
characteristics indicated. Thus, there is a tendency for those states
standing highest on Factor I to have a high newspaper circulation, a high
per capita gross national product, a high literacy rate, etc. In terms of
its loading, the first factor might be said to be a "Development" dimension;
the second, an "Authoritarianism" dimension; the third, a "U.S. Relations"
dimension; the fourth, a "Bigness" dimension; the fifth, a "Party-Mobil-
ization" dimension; the sixth, a "Density" dimension; the seventh, a
"Growth Rate" dimension; the eighth, a "Racial" dimension; the ninth, a
"U.S. Distance" dimension; the tenth, a "U.N. Pay" dimension; and the
eleventh, a "Distance" dimension. Thus, a state scoring high on Factor I
but low on Factor II tends to be a developed,non-democratic state, and a
state scoring in the middle to both factors tends to be a moderately
developed, semi-democratic state, etc. Combinations of scores between other
factors may be similarly interpreted.

The mystery surrounding factor analysis can be dispelled, <u>if it is</u>
<u>understood that the way the subjects are ordered on a factor dimension is</u>
<u>a highly similar way to the way in which they are ordered on the heaviest</u>
<u>loading variables</u>. Thus, if "Development" proves to be a good predictor

of questionnaire item, say, by having positive correlation with an item
such as 'Advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice should
be respected almost as if they were decision," then each of the heaviest
loading variables on the dimension, i.e., "newspaper circulation," "per
capita gross national produce," "literacy rate," etc. will very likely
have a similar correlation in the same direction with the item.[12] It should
be apparent that this study could have generated hundreds of significant
correlations by running all 48 of the independent variables separately
against the questionnaire items. But, for what purpose? If "newspaper
circulation" is virtually the same predictor as "per capita gross national
product" which is virtually the same as "literacy rate" etc., why not
replace all such predictors with a single predictor related to each?
This, of course, is what factor analysis does. A single significant
correlation of a factor dimension, with a questionnaire item, then, may
be the equivalent of several "significant" correlations, in the sense
that the variables loading most heavily on the dimension could have been
individually related to the item instead.

To summarize, the factor analysis of the national attributes of
the respondents' states has produced eleven predictors, each of which is
orthogonal to the others. Variance explained by one predictor, then,
will not also be explained by another predictor. Thus, we know that any
variance accounted for by "Authoritarianism" cannot be accounted for by
"Bigness" and so forth.

Generating Hypotheses

In order to facilitate analysis and discussion, it was decided to
predict the "direction" of relationship between the "independent indices"
and the questionnaire scores before the actual calculating of the correlations.[22]

These predictions are based upon what should be expected in terms of previous findings and, in the absence of other data, what seems "reasonable."

In the case of "Development," delegate members coming from the most developed states should have the most negative attitude orientations and delegates from the most underdeveloped states should have the most positive attitude orientations. This association is predicted because of the association of "negativism" and "Development" found in two previous studies.

The first, The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations: An Examination of Their Attitudes Toward the Organization, was based upon the 1961-62 sample of 61 respondents.[23] It analyzed delegate attitudes toward the major organs of the United Nations along caucusing group lines. A typical finding took the following form:[24]

Shifts in Security Council Importance by Caucusing Groups

By Percentages of Delegates

	Increasing	Decreasing	Same
African	35	18	41
Afro-Asian	24	32	41
Arab	20	30	50
Comm.	28	72	..
Europe	..	43	57
Latin American	29	29	36
Scandinavian	..	50	50
Soviet	60	..	20

Percentages in the nominal categories above, such as "increasing," were correlated with the economic development of the caucusing groups, defined as their average per capita gross national product. It was found, on a large number of questions, that a higher ratio of the members in the underdeveloped groups seemed to view the organization in more dynamic terms and be more positively oriented toward it than in the developed

groups. The study warned that, "Bi-polarization along economic lines
coupled with negativism on the part of the developed....could have
unfavorable consequences for the future of the United Nations."[25]

The second study, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate
Attitudes at the United Nations," extended the investigations of the first
study but changed the focus from groups to individual delegates. The
results and methods of that study may be summarized as follows:

> The article makes a case that United Nations dele-
> gates' attitudes are important for the operation and
> development of the United Nations because delegates make
> certain decisions, relay information, give advice, and
> engage in other kinds of activity which allow them to
> shape the institution in which they operate. A survey
> of attitudes concerning the major organs of the United
> Nations shows most delegates satisfied with the voting
> procedures, Charter membership arrangements, and role and
> past performance of the organs. Also, most delegates tend
> to see all organs as increasing in importance and express
> a desire to increase the role and powers of the organs.
> However, these sentiments vary from organ to organ and
> from question to question. For example, most delegates
> appear less satisfied with the voting procedures of the
> Security Council than those of the General Assembly.
> On all questions probed, however, there was wide range
> of response. The principal purpose of the project was
> to relate the variation in response to attributes of
> the respondents' states, such as their per capita gross
> national product. In all, forty-eight such attributes
> were considered, cutting across political, social, and
> economic areas. A factor analysis of the forty-eight
> variables, to eliminate confusing interrelationships,
> yielded eleven factors. The respondents' home states
> were located on the factors through the calculation of
> factor scores, and the factor scores in turn were related
> to the questionnaire data through correlational techniques.
> It was found that two factors were of primary importance,
> in the sense of producing numerous significant associations.
> These were: "Development" and "Distance" (from the U.S.S.R.
> and China). "Negative attitudes," defined in terms of
> "dissatisfaction" and a "desire to decrease" the role and
> importance of the organs, were found to be associated with
> "high development" and "closeness to the U.S.S.R. and
> China." Negativism by delegates from such states, parti-
> cularly developed states, was viewed as a potentially
> serious hampering influence, given the kind of support
> patterns needed for most U.N. activities. This study
> was based on 1965-66 data.[26]

It can be seen that there is considerable degree of agreement
between the two studies, regarding the importance of high economic
development as a predictor of "negative" delegate attitudes and on the
implications of this association for the future of the United Nations.
Also, a significant body of impressionistic literature about the United
Nations tends to imply that such an association might be the case.[27]

In more formal terms, the lack of enthusiasm with the United Nations
by delegates from developed states and positive orientation by delegates
from the underdeveloped states might be postulated as follows:

> States differ in their economic development. States
> with higher economic development generally have higher
> capabilities to supply needs, regardless of international
> organization affiliation, than states with lower economic
> development. International organizations may be considered
> devices which augment in a limited way the capabilities of
> states. Because the capabilities of developed states are
> already high, the contributions of international organi-
> zations to their capacities are generally less significant,
> as a fraction of total capabilities, than in the case of
> states with lower development. Because statesmen may
> value an augmentation of capabilities to the extent that
> it is a "significant increment," representatives from
> underdeveloped states may generally value international
> organizations more than developed states. This may be
> particularly true if representatives from underdeveloped
> states are in a position to have a considerable voice in
> the organization (i.e., have a majority where majority
> rule is used). Thus, attitudinal differences might be
> expected among statesmen, toward the United Nations and
> the international system, related to their home states'
> economic development. One might expect, for example,
> that representatives from economically underdeveloped
> states would be more inclined to wich to bolster the
> position of the organization than representatives from
> developed states.

In the case of "Authoritarianism," the delegates from the more
authoritarian states should have more negative attitudes than delegates
from the more democratic states. This prediction is made even though
"Authoritarianism" did not emerge as an important predictor in the
"National Attribute Study" and, in fact, was a weak predictor of certain

"positive" attitudes. The primary justification for this prediction
is the emphasis on sovereignty and nationalism by authoritarian regimes
of both "left" and "right" in their foreign policy pronouncements and
actions in connection with the United Nations. Without going into an
elaborate verification of this statement, one might cite the examples of
Portugal and the Union of South Africa, on the "right," as states who have
viewed the United Nations as impinging upon their legitimate interests,
and, on the "left," cite the refusal of many Communist states to pay their
special assessments as evidence of disenchantment.[28] Also, from a
doctrinal point of view, we would not expect representatives from quasi-
fascist states to be enthusiastic about supranational developments, nor
would we expect this from representatives from states with a strong
Marxian orientation, because of their presumed view that the governments
of other (capitalist) states are "aggressive" and not to be trusted.
One would expect, then, that such representatives would be suspicious
about the possibility of fruitful interaciton with non-communist states
within supranaitonal structures, particularly if the "capitalist" states
were in the majority.

Regarding "U.S. Relations," the closer the U.S. relations, the more
positive the delegates' attitudes should be. This prediction is made
because of the long standing U.S. support of the United Nations, financial
and otherwise.[29] For example, the U.S. carries more than twice the
economic load of any other state in regard to the regular budget and is
a very heavy contributor to the budgets of the specialized agencies. It
is possible that a "rub-off influence" might occur in respect to those
most closely identified with the United States.

Regarding "Bigness," the larger the state the respondent comes from,
the more negative his attitudes should be. Even though "Bigness" had

little explanatory power regarding attitudes toward organs, nevertheless it is reasonable to assume that this factor might operate in the same way as "Development," in the sense that representatives from large states, with big populations, may have less-felt need for the organization than representatives from smaller states.

Concerning "Party-Mobilization," those representatives whose states have the highest scores on this factor should have the most negative attitudes. This is predicted because, in the previous study, Party-Mobilization did emerge as a modest predictor of negative attitudes, and, because this dimension seems to be a strain of totalitariansim. That is, the reasons that apply in the case of "Authoritarianism" would apply here, even though this factor is statistically unrelated to "Authoritarianism."

Concerning "Density," the respondents from the least dense states should have the most positive attitudes. This prediction is made simply because "Density" emerged as a fairly important predictor of positive attitudes toward organs, although the possible reasons for this association remain obscure.

Concerning "Growth Rate," delegates from the states having the highest growth rate should have the most positive attitudes. Although "Growth Rate" emerged as a weak predictor of negative and static attitudes toward organs, this could have been accounted for in terms of random fluctuations. It is felt that, to the extent that high growth rate is viewed as a serious problem, there should be a likelihood that delegates from such states will look toward the United Nations for solutions and, therefore, be more committed toward the organization than those from low growth rate states.

Concerning the "Racial" dimension, no predictions will be made.
Of all the predictors in the previous study, it was the poorest and there
doesn't seem to be any reasonable grounds for a prediction here.

Regarding "U.S. Distance," again, no prediction will be made. This
is because this factor, like the Racial heterogeneity, had little predictive
power in the previous study and reasons for a predicted direction of
association are not clearly indicated.

Concerning "U.N. Pay," those coming from states making the highest
payments should have the most favorable attitudes.[30] Although U.N.
payments was a very "weak" predictor in the previous study, the associations
were in the direction suggested here.

Concerning "Distance," delegates from states that are far from
China and the U.S.S.R. should have positive attitudes. This is predicted
because high "Distance" emerged, just next to low "Development," as the
most important predictor of positive and dynamic attitudes toward organs in
the previous study. The exact reasons for this were not clear and it was
argued that, "The importance of 'Distance' may indicate a kind of negative/
statis attitudinal 'sphere of influence' emanating from the U.S.S.R. and
China, or it may simply provide a geographic reference that helps to
'locate' less positive delegate attitudes, the reasons for which are
obscure. Generally speaking, this predictor seems to indicate that African
and South American delegates are frequently more 'positive' and 'dynamic'
in their outlook than delegates closer to the U.S.S.R. and Communist China."

Methods

A primary method of analysis will be Spearman's <u>Rho</u>. This statistic is selected because it is "conservative" in the sense that minimal assumptions need to be made about the distributions of the variables employed. The only fundamental assumption that needs to be made is that higher values indicate "more." That is, cardinal values need not be assumed. Also, the tests of significance for Spearman's <u>Rho</u> do not assume that the sample was taken from a population that is normally distributed.

Before applying the Spearman <u>Rho</u> formula, the scores on all variables are converted to rank numbers with average ranks assigned in case of ties. A higher rank number, then, in each case, is used to indicate "more" of the variable under consideration. Thus, for example, a state with a rank score of 65 on the "Development" dimension is assumed to have more economic development than a state with a rank score of 64. Similarly, a respondent with a rank score of 60 on the questionnaire is assumed to be more negative in his attitudes than a respondent with a rank score of 59.[31]

Findings (Predictors' Simple Correlations with Items)

TABLE IV[32]

The above findings may be summarized as follows:

The higher a respondent's home state is on the Development factor (the more developed) the more likely it is that the respondent will:

(1) disagree that it is desirable to give the U.N. some limited taxing
powers,

(2) disagree that it is desirable to amend the Charter to give the Inter-
national Court of Justice absolute compulsory jurisdiction over
certain categories of cases,

(3) disagree that the advisory opinions of the International Court of
Justice should be respected almost as if they were decisions,

(4) disagree that the United Nations needs to be strengthened in almost
all aspects,

(5) disagree that it is desirable to place the remaining non-self govern-
ing territories more firmly under the control of the U.N.,

(6) agree that states should generally follow their national interest as
they pursue policies at the U.N.,

(7) disagree that suppressing the quest to achieve national interests
would generally benefit the United Nations,

(8) disagree that most states pay careful attention to United Nations
resolutions in formulating their policies,

(9) agree that to expect world peace in the near future in the sense
of man living harmoniously and cooperatively with man is basically
utopian,

(10) disagree that the state system in many ways seems outmoded.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the Authoritarianism
factor (more authoritarian) the more likely it is that the respondent will:

(1) disagree that it is desirable to give the United Nations, under suitable
conditions, a permanent international military force,

(2) disagree that it is desirable to amend the Charter to give the Inter-
national Court of Justice absolute compulsory jurisdiction over certain
categories of cases,

(3) disagree that the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice should be respected almost as if they were decisions,

(4) agree that each member state should decide for itself, in terms of its interests, the meaning of the Charter,

(5) agree that states should generally follow their national interests as they pursue policies at the U.N.,

(6) agree that if large scale war were to occur between the major powers, the United Nations would be of little use in controlling the conflict,

(7) disagree that conflict seems to be the normal state of affairs in international relations.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the U.S. Relations factor (the closer the U.S. Relations) the more likely it is the respondent will:

(1) agree that it would be desirable to amend the Charter to give the International Court of Justice absolute compulsory 'urisdiction over certain categories of cases,

(2) agree that advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice should be respected almost as if they were decisions,

(3) disagree that each member state should decide for itself, in terms of its interests, the meaning of the Charter,

(4) agree that conflict seems to be the normal state of affairs in international relations.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the Bigness factor (the bigger, etc.) the more likely it is that the respondent will:

(1) disagree that it would desirable to amend the Charter to give the International Court of Justice absolute compulsory jurisdiction over certain categories of cases,

(2) disagree that advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice
should be respected almost as if they were decisions,

(3) agree that most states pay careful attention to United Nations resolu-
tions in formulating their policies,

(4) disagree that the national state system in many ways seems outmoded.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the Party-Mobiliza-
tion factor (one party-mobilized) the more likely it is that the respondent
will:

(1) disagree that members of the Secretariat should be selected solely on
merit (no geographic considerations),

(2) agree that the United Nations seems to have more influence on world
affairs than it did 5 to 10 years ago,

(3) disagree that states can apparently openly defy the United Nations with
little loss of international status.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the Density factor
(the less dense) the more likely the respondent will:

(1) disagree that it would be desirable to amend the Charter to give the
International Court of Justice absolute compulsory jurisdiction over
certain categories of cases,

(2) agree that the United Nations seems to have contributed significantly
to reducing conflict in the modern world,

(3) agree that there are few international problems that the U.N., in its
present form, is not capable of solving if a real effort is made to use
its facilities.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the Growth Rate
factor (the highest the growth rate) the more likely it is that the res-
pondent will:

(1) agree that if the world is to disarm, it is desirable to give the U.N.

major responsibility rather than some agency outside of the U.N. system.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the Racial factor
(the more radically heterogeneous) the more likely it is that the respondent
will:

(1) agree that it is generally preferable to pursue one's national interests

instead of moral values, if they come into conflict.

No significant correlations emerged between the U.S. Distance
factor and the questionnaire items.

No significant correlations emerged between the U.N. Pay factor
and the questionnaire items.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the Distance factor
(the farther from U.S.S.R. and China) the more likely it is that the
respondent will:

(1) disagree that conflict seems to be the normal state of affairs in

international relations.

The above results may be tabulated by ordering the predictors in
terms of the number of significant correlations produced by each.

TABLE V

If we compare the number of significant correlations that emerged
in respect to "wishes" with the number that emerged in respect to "percep-
tions" we see that more occur proportionately in the case of "wishes" and,
also, many more occur than would be expected by chance. Thus, in connection
with "wishes," operating at the .05 level, we would only expect 6.5 correla-
tions by chance (11 x 12 matrix) and in the case of "perceptions" 7.5 cor-
relations (11 x 14 matrix). In fact, in the case of "wishes," 20 significant

correlations emerged, 13.5 more than we would have expected by chance alone, and, in the case of "perceptions," 14 significant correlations emerged, 6.5 more than we would have expected by chance. Thus, the predictors seem to have more relevance, in terms of predictive power, in the case of "wishes" than in the case of "perceptions."

An interesting question that arises concerns the consistency of the predictors (in terms of the ratio of significant associations produced) when these results are compared with the "National Attribute" study cited above. It will be recalled that the latter study concerned itself with the relevance of the predictors in regard to "positive" or "negative" delegate attitudes toward organs. To make this comparison, in each study the number of significant correlations for each predictor is divided by the number of items. Thus, in a particular study, an index of .25 would indicate that a predictor was significantly related to 25% of all the questions asked.[33]

TABLE VI

It can be seen that "Development" exhibits considerable "power" in both studies, relating to 40% of the items in this study and 54% in the "National Attribute" study. "Authoritarianism" and "U.S. Relations" markedly "rise" in this study, but "Party-Mobilization," "Distance," and "U.S. Distance" fall off considerably, and a number of predictors such as "U.N. Pay," "Racial," and "Growth Rate" exhibit little power in either study. This table, however, clearly highlights the importance of "Development" for both studies and the "rise" of "Authoritarianism" for this study.

The predictors can also be ordered in respect to their "purity." To make this analysis, the "wishes" and "perceptions" items will be lumped together, and the predictors' importance expressed in terms of its power

to consistently predict positive or negative item responses when we think in terms of high predictor scores. Thus, the "purity" (and importance) of a predictor is estimated by subtracting the number of positive predictions from the number of negative predictions and expressing the resulting difference in absolute terms. Thus, if high predictor scores tend to associate fairly equally with both the negative/positive responses, the predictors' purity index should fall toward zero. Also, of course, the fewer correlations associated with a predictor, the lower will be its index. The scoring scheme, then, takes into account both purity and importance. That is, the larger the number of significant correlations made by the predictor and the greater the tendency for high predictor scores to be associated with either negative or positive scores, the larger the predictor's index.

The following table shows the results of the analysis.

TABLE VII

As indicated above, the table can be understood in terms of the kinds of responses associated with high factor scores. The analysis shows "high development" and "high authoritarianism" most consistly predicts negative scores, and so on.

We can now use the purity index to make judgments concerning our hypotheses. The table that follows indicates whether or not expectations were supported by observations. Naturally, the higher the purity index, the more relevant the predictor is. Thus, even though the expectations were supported in the case of "Distance," the purity index is so weak that we probably don't want to view this predictor, and others like it, as having much importance.

TABLE VIII

All of the above, of course, indicates just one of several possible
approaches to the analytic problem. It is apparent that predictive power
(in terms of the magnitude of correlation) has been fairly modest. One
way to maximize predictability, although it may dilute somewhat the micro-
scopic clearness resulting from the above analysis, is to apply the canonical
correlation model.[34] Simply put, the canonical technique weights each
variable in two sets to maximize the correlation of two sets of scores
predicted by them, one from one set and one from the other. In terms of
this study, then, the canonical technique answers the question of what
weights must be assigned to the Development, Authoritarianism, US relations,
etc., factor dimension scores to predict a set of scores that will correlate
highest with a set of score predicted by the questionnaire scores, weighted
using the same criterion of maximum correlation. Thus, the canonical tech-
nique can be viewed as a two-way multiple regression scheme with each of two
sets of variables weighted to produce a maximal correlation between the values
generated from the two sets. The weights assigned to the variables, then,
tell us the importance of each variable in generating the overall relation-
ship. This in turn answers our research question as to what is important
and what is not important in overall terms, something that can remain
ambiguous when an ordinary multiple regression scheme is used, taking the
dependent variables one at a time. Further and most important, the canonical
technique tends to produce high correlations so that predictive power
increases. To simplify interpretation, the questionnaire variables will be
reduced to a smaller orthogonal set (factor scores), through factor analysis,
as was the case with the original predictor variables.

The question might be raised here, why not apply the canonical
technique to both sets of original variables, that is, before factor

in either case? The answer is, as in ordinary multiple regression analysis, intercorrelations between the variables in either set makes it difficult to interpret predictive importance. This is because each variable is only allowed to explain unique variance and the variance that are variable might explain, in the absence of another highly correlated variable, may be "wiped out" given the presence of that other variable in the analysis, as the latter, through the weighting process, is assigned explanatory "credit." The interpretation of weights, then, remains ambiguous as long as intercorrelations are present between variables in either set.

Analysis may be facilitated by discussing certain further considerations about canonical weights at this juncture. Arbitrarily assigning X for independent canonical variate scores and Y for dependent canonical variate scores, because such scores are composite scores, it becomes important to see if the Y dimension (built out of the attitudinal factors) has the quality of relative "purity" (evidencing basically a "negative" or "positive" orientation in terms of our judges assessments. That is, it is desirable, for analytical purposes, to have the high or low Y scores defined primarily in terms of factor scores that imply either a "negative" or "positive" orientation. Because each dependent factor dimension is orthogonal to every other dimension, it is possible that the canonical correlation technique will weigh one attitude dimension to make "positive" attitude responses contribute to high Y scores and weigh another dimension to make "negative" attitude responses contribute to high Y scores (assuming that the dimensions, themselves, are relatively "pure"). Should this occur, it will be difficult to speak generally about the negative or positive attitudinal propensities of those standing high or low on the canonical dimensions, and it will be necessary to look at each dependent

factor dimension and its weight individually. On the other hand, if high (or low) Y canonical variate scores are defined primarily in either "negative" or "positive" attitudinal terms then broad generalizations will be possible. Thus, should this be the case, it will be possible to say, for example, that those respondents coming from highly developed states with a high growth rate, etc., tend to score on the ends of the question- naire factor dimensions that generally imply either "negative" or "positive" attitudes.

As suggested above, a first step, to facilitate the canonical analysis, is to factor analyze the questionnaire variables. Table IX gives the results.

TABLE IX

The 25 original variables reduce to 10 factors. The amount of variance explained by each factor and the variables loading above .30 are given in the above table. In each case the kind of response necessary to produce a high factor score is indicated and, also, how that response can be characterized in "negative" or "positive" terms based on the decisions of the judges discussed earlier.[35] To illustrate, in the case of Factor I, a respondent with a high factor score tends to disagree that the Secretary General and members of the Secretariat can become international persons; disagree that the United Nations should be given major disarmament respon- sibilities; disagree that the United Nations should be given limited taxing powers; disagree that the United Nations environment makes a person less nationalistic. (Other factors can be similarly "interpreted").

A person with a low factor score, of course, tends to have the opposite response pattern from that indicated above. Thus, such a subject should tend

to agree that members of the Secretariat can become international persons;
agree that the United Nations should be given major disarmament respons-
ibilities, and so forth.

The analysis indicates that many of the factors are relatively pure,
in the sense that high or low factor scores tend to be produced by either
"negative" or "positive" attitudes. Thus, in the case of the first factor,
high factor scores are defined primarily in terms of five negative responses
and, of course, low factor scores are defined primarily in terms of five
positive responses. The "purity" of the second factor is two to one; the
third, seven to zero; the fourth, six to one; the fifth, three to zero; the
sixth, four to two; the seventh, five to zero; the eighth, three to one; the
ninth, three to zero; and the tenth, one to zero.

Factor analysis, then, has produced ten scales, most of which can be
interpreted as measures of negative-positive attitudes. Thus, on the purer
scales the signs of the factor scores (in standard score form) can be viewed
as measuring, basically, "negative" or "positive" attitude orientations
depending upon the direction of the scale. The scales, then, can be thought
of in the following terms:

TABLE X

We can, then, characterize the respondents as having either a "negative"
or "positive" orientation depending upon their location on the scales. Thus,
a respondent scoring highest on Factors I, II, III, VII, and IX, but lowest
on Factors IV, V, VI, VIII and X can be viewed as evidencing basically negative
attitudes. Conversely, a respondent scoring lowest on Factors I, II, III, VII,
and IX, but highest on Factors IV, V, VI, VIII, and X can be said to be
expressing basically positive attitudes.[9]

To summarize: the twenty-five original variables of the questionnaire

have been condensed into ten factor dimensions which are independent of one another in the sense that the factor score location of one cannot be used to predict the factor score location of another. Most of the factor dimensions are basically "pure" in the sense that high or low factor scores are primarily defined either in terms of "positive" or "negative" attitudinal responses, as determined by the non-delegate judges.

Findings (Canonical Analysis)

When the canonical technique is applied, the following relationships emerge between the variables.[36]

TABLE XI

The above shows that Factors I, II, III, and IV contribute most heavily to the canonical X scores (predictor side) and questionnaire Factors I, II, III, IV, and VIII contribute most heavily to the canonical Y scores (questionnaire side). To facilitate discussion, the most salient relationships may be expressed in a more convenient form in the following table.

TABLE XII

This table indicates that if a respondent came from a state that is undemocratic (high on predictor Factor II) and developed (high on predictor Factor I) and without close ties to the United States (low on predictor Factor III) and possessing the quality of bigness (high on predictor Factor IV) then he tends to score high on questionnaire Factors III and I, and low on questionnaire Factors VIII, II, and IV. In fact, the countries of the eight highest X scorers are all well known for being

undemocratic (of both East and West), are well "developed," on a world-wide scale, have few U.S. relations (see loadings on independent Factor IV), and are large. The predicted dependent pattern is also verified. Thus, the highest X scorer (from an "Eastern" state) has factor scores of .66, -1.10, .97, 1.13, and -1.12 on dependent Factors I, II, III, IV and VIII respectively (a perfect prediction in terms of the high-low character of the pattern). The second highest X scorer (also from an "Eastern" state) has a pattern of .53, -.93, 1.17, .76 and -.98 respectively, on the same factors (another perfect prediction). Thus, the weights in the canonical correlation, with a high degree of accuracy, describe the state characteristics of those who, in fact, have the high-low response patterns necessary to produce high canonical Y scores. In each case, except one, the predicted questionnaire factor scores are produced primarily from factor scores assumed to connote negative behavior. For example, in the case of questionnaire Factor III, seven negative variable responses contribute most to the predicted high factor scores. Only in the case of questionnaire Factor II (which, incidentally, is a "weak" factor with a two to one purity ratio) does a predominance of "positive" variable scores contribute primarily to the predicted pattern. If the frequency of "negative" v. "positive" responses in the salient factors are counted, then 22 negative responses and 4 positive variable responses are involved in producing the high canonical Y scores.

The question might be asked, what is the "predictive loss" if just these heaviest weighted variables are considered in the canonical correlation? The table that follows shows the results.

TABLE XIII

Only a 12% shrinkage in "variance explained" between the canonical
variate scores occurs if variables V through XI are "thrown out" on the
independent side, and variables V, VI, VII, IX, and X on the dependent
side. Thus, the predictive importance of all the lesser weighted variables
is fairly small compared to those of greater weight.

Discussion

This study reaffirms the importance of economic development as a
predictor of delegate attitudes. In the various studies thus far carried
out, high economic development has been consistently associated with
negativism.[37] In this regard, it is interesting to note that there is
a considerable time spread in these studies and, therefore, a persistence
is evident in regard to this negativism. Unfortunately, no samples were
taken before 1956, that is, before the infusion of so many underdeveloped
states into the United Nations. Therefore, there is no way of assessing
whether delegate attitudes from developed states became more negative
after 1956. In other words, the negativism found may be a consequence
of a partial "taking over" of the organization by delegates from the
more underdeveloped states, or, it may be related to the more fundamental
reasons given above in the section entitled, "Generating Hypotheses."
That is, such negativism may have existed from the very beginning and be
related to basic state capabilities. What is notable about this finding,
however, is that there is a kind of contradiction between such attitudes
an the actual fiscal support given by states to the United Nations. Thus,
because of the scale of contributions, the most economically developed
states must give more to the organization than the underdeveloped states

and have from the very beginning. Why shouldn't this proven economic
support by their home states be reflected in "commitment" by "developed"
delegates toward the organization? The reasons for this may not be
completely baffling. It is easy to imagine that persons who give more
to their national governments may feel less commitment to the system than
those who give less and, perhaps, receive more. To put it another way,
even though developed states give more to the organization, in fact, the
organization, as such, may give more to underdeveloped states. Thus, the
"giving" on the part of the more developed states may be viewed as a sort
of undesirable "taxation" whereas the recipients of many U.N. related
functions, i.e., as through the specialized agencies, may be expressing a
real felt appreciation for such activities. Also, possibly very important
in this regard, is the fact that the U.N. is basically democratic in its
character. That is, the evident "power" of the more developed states,
(except in the case of the Security Council), is not translated into
privileges within the organization. In a sense, then, delegates from
underdeveloped states enjoy a privileged position vis-a-vis the more
developed and powerful states in the organization in contrast to their
"weak" position in respect to such states outside the United Nations
arena. In short, there may be a variety of reasons for the association
that has been found here and, in any case, these findings do not in any
way undercut the more theoretical propositions expressed above.

As suggested above, the association of negativism with "Authoritar-
ianism" may be the consequence of both doctrinaire and historic factors
relating to the views of persons from such systems. In a sense, authorit-
arian regimes, of both right and left, have been the step-children of
the organization. Many of the more authoritarian regimes on the right

have come under a great deal of organizational scutiny regarding "colonies"
and authoritarian regimes on the left have been criticized for violations
of fundamental human rights. Also, of course, the U.S.S.R., as the
champion of the Communist camp, at one point in the organization's
history was condemned for its violation of the United Nation's Charter
(Hungarian crisis). What is surprising about this finding, however, is
its inconsistency with the finding, in the "National Attribute Study,"
of a weak relationship between "Authoritarianism" and positive attitudes
toward organs. This does tie in with certain voting studies, however,
where authoritarianism has been found to predict "positive" votes in some
cases to "negative" ones in others.[38] In any case, these findings suggest
something incompatible between support of the United Nations system, in at
least some respects, and undemocratic systems.

The general lack of relationships in respect to the rest of the
predictors (with the exception of"U.S. Relations" and "Bigness" in the
canonical correlation) is somewhat surprising, but not overly so, in view
of the findings in the "National Attribute" study. Although the "direction"
of correlation was accurately predicted in a number of cases, simple
correlations were few and far between. Assuming that predictors treated
in this study cut across many of the measureable characteristics of nation
states, these findings do seem to suggest that, if one wants to account
for additional variance in the questionnaire scores, one may want to move
to different kinds of indices. The ones that immediately suggest themselves
are ones relating to "personality structure" and "past experience" of the
delegates. This suggests a fruitful area for additional research, should
the delegates prove to be cooperative in regard to such probing.

At a more general level, these findings tie in well with concepts
and research pioneered by R. J. Rummel under the title of "Social Field
Theory." The fundamental axioms may be summarized as follows: 1) inter-
national relations is a field consisting of all the attributes and inter-
actions of nations and their complex interrelationships"; 2) "the inter-
national relations field can be analytically divided into attribute, A,
and behavior, B, spaces in which attributes and interactions are projected,
respectively, as vectors"; 3) "the attitribute and behavioral spaces are
generated by a finite set of linear independent dimensions"; 4) "nations
are located as vectors in attribute space and coupled into dyads in
behavior space"; 5) "the distance vectors of A-space that connect nations
are social forces determining locations of dyads in B-space"; 6) "the
direction and velocity of movement over time of a dyad in B-space is along
the resolution vector of the forces, d, and 7, "B-space is a subspace of
of A-space."[39]

The above statements give one, at the same time, a way to con-
ceptualize the international system and suggest applications and tests
of these notions in the fabric of linear algebra. Rummel has argued "the
mathematical model underlining the theory is linear algebra. This is
itself the field of mathematics which in application is the architect of
a number of scientific theories, thus making possible the search for
scientific analogies. Moreover, because of their mathematical form,
product moment correlation, multiple regression, and factor analysis,
the tools often employed by social scientists, are structurally a part
of linear algebra ... For testing a scientific theory, the method employed
should be structurally isomorphic with the mathematics of the theory.
The theory elaborated here has that isomorphism with the product moment

correlation, with multiple regression, and with factor analysis. These
serve as its methods."[40]

Applications, then, have typically involved factor analyses of
attribute measures and then, separately, behavioral measures which are
related, using correlational techniques, in order to test the proposition
that one can account for variance in B-space from A-space. Elaboration
of the fundamental notions, however, have led to two distinct models of
the international system. The first, model I, is given as

$$v_{i \to j, k} = \sum_{\ell=1}^{p} \alpha_\ell d_{i-j, \ell}$$

where $v_{i \to j, k}$ is the behavior of nation i to nation j on the kth dimension
of behavior space, d is the distance vector between i and j on the ℓth
dimension of the p-dimensional space of nation attributes, and α_ℓ is the
corresponding parameter.[41]

This equation asserts that if we select any particular behavioral
measure, we can account for the variance on that dimension by a weighted
sum of the attribute dimensions, expressed in distance vector terms. In
other words, we expect a perfect correlation between the scores generated
from the latter weighted sum and the former behavioral dimension scores.
Distance vectors in this formulation are obtained by computing factor
score differences for the subjects on the various attribute dimensions.

The second formulation, model II, is given as[42]

$$v_{i \to j, k} = \sum_{\ell=1}^{p} \alpha_{i_\ell} d_{i-j, \ell}$$

The primary difference between the equations is that the parameter
weights α are allowed to vary for each actor i in the latter model. For
example, each state may receive a different weight on the distance vectors

of an attribute dimension, such as "Economic Development," in predicting some behavioral dimension, such as relating primarily to exports.

These two equations may be compared to with a third entitled "Attribute Theory" given

$$w_{ik} = \sum_{\ell=1}^{p} \beta_\ell s_i$$

where w_{ik} is the <u>total behavior</u> of nation i on the kth behavioral dimension, $s_{i\ell}$ is the ℓth attribute dimension of the p-dimensional space of nation attributes, and β_ℓ the corresponding parameters.[43]

Rummel has shown that the parameters of Model I, of Social Field Theory, are deducible from Attribute Theory and vice versa, in the senese that the α_ℓ of Model I are mathematically related to the β_ℓ of Attribute Theory. The relationship is given as $\alpha_\ell = \beta_\ell/n$.[44] It naturally follows that $\beta_\ell = n\alpha_\ell$ and $n = \beta_\ell/\alpha_\ell$. In short, the weights given to the attribute dimensions of Attribute Theory can be used to predict the weights given to the distance vectors of Social Field Theory, Model I, and vice versa. For example, if ten states are treated in Attribute Theory and the weight assigned to the "Economic Development" dimension is 5, in predicting a behavioral dimension, then the weight for the "Economic Development" distance vectors in Social Field Theory, Model I, will be .5, assuming that we start with the same data and the prediction is to be without error.[45] Viewed in these terms, then, any test of Model I of Social Field Theory can be viewed as a test for Attribute Theory and vice versa.

Rummel also demonstrates that there is no similar mathematical relationship between the parameters of Model II and those of Attribute Theory.

From the above, it might be surmised that the present project be
viewed as a test of either Attribute Theory or Model I. Unfortunately,
however, the relationship, asserted by Rummel, refers to, in the case
of Attribute Theory, total behavior calculated by summing individual
dyadic behaviors. For example, total exports are computed for an in-
dividual nation by summing together each of its exports to all other
nations. This immediately raised the question of whether some acts
are fundamentally dyadic in the international system, while others are
not and, therefore, not captured, at least in the formal sense, in the
mathematical expressions given above. That is, all of the "behavior"
referred to above represents dyadic behavior or a sum of dyadic behavior
(i.e., total behavior). In discussing behavior, Rummel argues "inter-
action ... is defined as a behavioral act: any action of one nation
toward a specific other nation. This action then couples the two nations
together. Thus, the exports of Peru to Bolivia is an action coupling the
two nations. Two nations so coupled by the actions of one are called
a dyad, and the action involved is dyadic behavior."[46]

Can the attitudinal information gathered in this study be considered
dyadic in the way described in the above quotation? I think not. When
a delegate expresses an attitude toward an attitude object, such as the
Security Council, this would not seem to be a dyadic relation of the kind
as when a delegate sends a threat to another nation, such as Japan. That
is, subjects of Rummel's studies are nations in dyadic relationships (and
their attribute distances "explain their dyadic relationships). To include
an attitude object, such as the Security Council, as an aspect of a dyadic
relation, then, is tantamount to including non-national subjects in
the study.

In the present study, then, all attitude objects would become subjects whose "attributes", to compute attribute distances, would have to be determined. When we think of dyadic relationships, of course, we normally think of actors who can actually act toward one another, i.e. the United States can act toward Japan, and Japan can act toward the United States. It should be evident that some attitude objects, such as the International Court of Justice could, conceivably, be seen as falling into an "actor" category, while others, such as attitudes towards the Charter, moral values, UN tax, etc., can not. The latter attitude objects appear "passive" in nature, in contrast to the former, and, of course, hosts of other passive attitude objects can be easily thought of.

If, however, one ignores the constraints that the total behavior in Attribute Theory should represent a summation of discrete dyadic acts refer to a relationship with another nation actor, then, given this relaxation, the present work can be viewed as falling under Attribute Theory. In this latter view, attributes explain all behavior, not just behavior that is "dyadic" and directed toward other nations. Because behavior, in this latter sense, is not viewed as a summation of discrete dyadic acts, it is not possible, of course, to deduce Model I parameters from such an application of attribute theory. To put it another way, expressions of attitudes are not assumed to be dyadic in form unless expressed toward another nation actor, which is not the case in this study, and Model I demands "dyadic relations." At the most general level, however, that is, in respect to the notion that attributes and behavior are linked, this work can be viewed as complementary to Social Field Theory. Most important, perhaps, is the fact that "Economic

Development," as measured by energy consumption divided by population, has had considerable predictive importance in tests of both Model I and Model II.

To summarize, then, a test of Attribute Theory, as formulated by the above equation, but where the notion of behavior is relaxed in the sense that it is not viewed as representing summation of dyadic acts toward nations, yields a partial fit between A- and B-space. Strictly speaking, however, if a true basis for A-space has been applied in this study, the universal proposition as expressed in Attribute Theory, has been falsified. That is, we do not find that we can account for all of the variation in B-space through weighted combinations of A-space. An easy rejoinder, of course, is that the attribute dimensions utilized in the study are not a true basis of A-space because of the limited number of variables employed in the analysis.[47] It might be mentioned, in this connection, that in other studies where I have used a larger number of variables, more A-space dimensions do emerge. In those studies, however, regardless of how many variables I have employed, less than 50 percent of B-space has been accounted for by A-space. This suggests a possible recasting of some of the fundamental notions of Field and Attribute Theory in probablistic terms. Such a suggestion, however, may raise a kind of philosophical dilemma. As long as Attribute and the Social Field Theories are cast in a deterministic mode (no error factor), "tests" may continually appear to falsify the basic equations. If a probabilistic model is adopted, where error is admitted, however, (the verbal equivalent would take the form of "some of the variation in the basis of B-space can be accounted or by variation in the basis

of A-space") such a proposition would appear to be easily and perhaps perpetually verified and cannot, as is now well understood, be falsified. In this sense, then, such a proposition almost appears trivial and is, perhaps, one of the reasons why Rummel has resisted a probabilistic approach to his fundamental notions. If, however, substantial portions of the variance of B-space can be shown to be accounted for by A-space, and, stable patterns in this regard can be uncovered, perhaps, this will be reward enough. Although the deterministic model may always be doomed to be falsified[48] and the probabilistic model to be verified, nevertheless, considering the useful information that may be generated from studies, stimulated by such notions, the end result may be pragmatically adequate in the sense of providing guidance for those who wish to rationally manipulate certain aspects of the international system.

SUMMARY

When United Nations delegates were asked to mark a questionnaire probing matters concerning the United Nations system and international affairs, different behavioral patterns emerged within a cooperative group of delegates. For the most part, delegates generally seem "positive" in regard to both their wishes and perceptions. When the questionnaire scores were related to the predictors (factors calculated from attributes concerning the respondents' home states) two factors assumed superior predictive power: "Development" and "Authoritarianism." High scores in both cases were related to negative questionnaire responses. This finding reinforces the importance of "Development" as a

predictor of U.N. delegate attitudes, and suggest that another factor,
"Authoritarianism," may also be of some importance. These findings
also appear to have considerable relevance for notions developed under
the concepts of Attribute and Social Field Theory.[49]

FIGURE I

A MODEL FOR THE EXPLORATION OF DELEGATE INFLUENCES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

TABLE I

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS' STATES

	Size					Population			
	Sample		Universe			Sample		Universe	
	N	%	N	%		N	%	N	%
Very Large	5	7.0	6	5.2	Very Large	3	4.0	4	3.4
Large	12	18.5	26	22.6	Large	11	17.0	23	20.0
Medium	21	32.5	36	31.4	Medium	24	37.0	34	29.6
Small	27	42.0	47	40.8	Small	27	42.0	54	47.0
	65	100%	115	100%		65	100%	115	100%

Chi-square = .883
3 Degrees of Freedom = .80 level or more

Chi-square = 1.344
3 Degrees of Freedom = .70 level or more

	Agricultural Population					Literacy Rate			
	Sample		Universe			Sample		Universe	
	N	%	N	%		N	%	N	%
High	23	35.5	56	49.5	High	18	28.0	25	23.8
Medium	27	42.0	33	29.2	Medium	19	39.0	30	28.6
Low	12	18.0	17	15.1	Low	14	21.5	24	22.8
Very Low	3	4.5	7	6.2	Ver Low	14	21.5	26	24.8
	65	100%	113	100%		65	100%	105	100%

Chi-square = 4.184
3 Degrees of Freedom = .20 level or more

Chi-square = .465
3 Degrees of Freedom = .70 level or more

	Freedom of the Press			
	Sample		Universe	
	N	%	N	%
Complete Freedom	24	37.0	43	44.4
Intermittent Freedom	17	26.0	17	17.5
Freedom Internally Absent	16	25.0	21	21.6
Freedom Internally & Externally Absent	8	12.0	16	16.5
	65	100%	97	100%

Chi-square = 3.079
3 Degrees of Freedom = .30 level or more

TABLE I (continued)

Status of Legislature

	Sample		Universe	
	N	%	N	%
Fully Effective	17	26.0	28	28.0
Partially Effective	18	28.0	23	23.0
Largely Ineffective	12	18.0	21	21.0
Wholly Ineffective	18	28.0	28	28.0
	65	100%	100	100%

Chi-square = .49795
3 Degrees of Freedom = .90 level or more

Geographic Location

	Sample		Universe	
	N	%	N	%
Africa (includes N. Africa)	16	25.0	33	28.7
Americas	10	15.5	24	20.8
Asia (includes Australia)	11	17.0	20	17.5
Eastern Europe	6	9.0	9	7.8
Middle East	10	15.5	11	9.6
Western Europe	12	18.0	18	15.6
	65	100%	115	100%

Chi-square = 2.3745
5 Degrees of Freedom = .70 level or more

Chi-square to be interpreted as testing the proposition there are no

significant differences between the two distributions (sample and

universe). Chi-square would have to reach 7.81 for 3 degrees of freedom

and 9.48 for 5 degrees of freedom, operating at the .05 level.

TABLE II

Wishes

Items	Fiducial Limit	Sample Means	Fiducial Limit	Standard Deviations	Standard Error
1	11.3	13.1	14.8	7.0	.87
2	3.9	5.2	6.5	5.5	.68
3	7.7	9.4	11.1	6.9	.86
4	6.4	8.2	10.0	7.1	.88
5	2.7	4.1	5.5	5.5	.68
6	2.3	2.9	3.5	3.1	.28
7	6.0	7.9	9.8	7.5	.93
8	11.6	13.2	14.8	6.6	.82
9	14.8	16.2	17.6	5.5	.68
10	6.6	8.0	9.4	5.7	.71
11	9.8	11.3	12.8	6.3	.76

Perceptions

Items	Fiducial Limit	Sample Means	Fiducial Limit	Standard Deviations	Standard Error
1	7.1	8.7	10.3	6.6	.82
2	4.2	5.5	6.8	5.1	.63
3	7.5	9.0	10.5	6.3	.76
4	4.1	5.3	6.5	4.8	.60
5	3.1	4.2	4.3	4.5	.56
6	3.1	4.5	5.9	5.5	.68
7	6.0	7.7	9.4	6.7	.83
8	5.1	6.6	8.1	6.1	.76
9	8.1	9.9	11.7	7.4	.92
10	6.8	8.4	10.0	6.3	.78
11	5.4	6.9	8.4	5.9	.73
12	7.6	9.3	11.0	7.0	.87
13	10.2	12.0	13.8	7.2	.90
14	9.2	10.9	12.6	6.9	.86

The setting of fiducial limits assumes the distribution of sample means (if repeated samples are taken) is normally distributed but does not assume that the sample or universe distributions are perfectly normal.

TABLE III

Factor I (Variance accounted for = 21.6%) (Development)

High Newspaper Circulation (.88)   High Literacy Rate (.86)   High Per
Capita Gross National Product (.86)   High Economic Development Status
(.83)   High Percent Urban (.83)   Westernized (.83)   Low Agricultural
Population (.79)   Negligible Interest Articulation by Non-Associational
Groups (.78)   Modern Bureaucracy (.77)   Significant Interest Articulation
by Associational Groups (.70)   Politically Modern (.60)   High Gross
National Product (.55)   High International Financial Status (.54)   Old
(.43)   High Political Inculturation (.43)   Large Military (.43)   High
United Nations Pay (.43)   Low Ratio of People per School (.42)
Linguistic Homogeneity (.40)   Representative System (.40)   Effective
Legislature (.39)   Many IGO Memberships (.38)   Long Time in UN (.38)
Significant Interest Articulation by Parties (.37)   Low Distance from
US (.34)   Non-Communist (.30)   Religious Homogeneity (.30)   High United
Nations Emergency Force Pay (.30)

Factor II (Variance accounted for = 16.7%) (Authoritarianism)

No Effective Constitution Limitations (.87)   High Censorship (.87)
Ineffective Legislature (.83)   Opposition Groups Not Tolerated (.82)
Not Representative System (.81)   Strong Executive (.79)   Elitist Poli-
tical Leadership (.77)   Participation by Military (.72)   Significant
Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups (.64)   Negligible Interest
Articulation by Associational Groups (.47)   Mobilized System Style (.47)
Communist Bloc (.41)   Traditional Bureaucracy (.37)   Communist Alliance
(.31)

TABLE III (continued)

Factor III (Variance accounted for = 7.8% (US Relations)

Large Import from US (.86)   Large Export to US (.77)   Allied With West
(.72)   Linguistic Homogeneity (.55)   Religious Homogeneity (.43)
Non-communist (.42)   Long Distance from USSR (.40)   Long Time in UN (.32)
High Population Growth Rate (.30)

Factor IV (Variance accounted for = 9.3%) (Bigness)

Big Population (.87)   High International Financial Status (.73)   Big
Gross National Product (.72)   Big Country (.67)   Large Military (.66)
Large United Nations Delegation Size (.59)   High United Nations Pay (.53)
Long Time in UN (.33)   Significant Interest Articulation by Institutional
Groups (.31)   Politically Modern (.31)   High Economic Development Status
(.30)   Many IGO Memberships (.30)

Factor V (Variance accounted for = 4.4%) (Party-Mobilization)

One Party System (.76)   Mobilized System Style (.65)   High Political
Inculturation (.54)   Negligible Interest Articulation by Parties (.35)
Communist Bloc (.31)

Factor VI (Variance accounted for = 3.6%) (Density)

Low Population Density (.87)   Big Country (.59)

Factor VII (Variance accounted for = 3.2%) (Growth Rate)

High Population Growth Rate (.76)   Non-Elitist Political Leadership (.33)
Linguistic Heterogeneity (.32)   Small IGO Memberships (.30)

Factor VIII (Variance accounted for = 3%) (Racial)

Racial Heterogeneity (.80)   Short Time in UN (.43)

TABLE III (continued)

Factor IX (Variance accounted for = 5.2%) (U.S. Distance)

Low Distance from U.S. (.75)   Low Ratio of People per School (.58)

Old (.47)   Many IGO Memberships (.44)   Politically Modern (.39)   Long

Time in U. (.44)   Religious Homogeneity (.35)   Non-Communist (.35)

Factor X (Variance accounted for = 3%) (UN Pay)

High United Nations Emergency Force Payment (.68)   High United Nations

Payment (.44)   Limited Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups (.31)

Factor XI (Variance accounted for = 4.4%) (Distance)

Long Distance from China (.81)   Long Distance from USSR (.68)   Low

Political Inculturation (.37)

TABLE IV

WANTS (Agrees)	Factor I High Development	Factor II Authoritarian	Factor III Close U.S. Relations	Factor IV Is big	Factor V One Party Mobilized	Factor VI Low Density	Factor VII High Growth Rate	Factor VIII Racial heterogeneity	Factor IX Low Distance from U.S.	Factor X High U.S. Tax	Factor XI High Distance USSR and China
1. U.N. tax	-.28	-.05	.05	-.05	-.12	-.04	.08	-.04	-.00	-.15	-.06
2. U.N. military force	-.17	-.26	.04	.02	-.08	.03	.21	.09	-.05	-.03	-.01
3. ICJ compulsory jurisdiction	-.25	-.35	.31	-.27	-.21	-.35	-.06	-.02	-.05	.02	.10
4. Respect for ICJ opinions	-.37	-.44	.29	-.25	-.08	-.30	.06	-.28	-.12	.05	.01
5. U.N. responsible for disarmament	-.11	-.10	.04	.05	.01	.13	.42	.16	-.12	-.08	-.24
6. U.N. strengthened	-.27	.01	-.10	.11	.23	.09	-.03	-.05	-.16	-.20	-.23
7. Non-self-governing under U.N.	-.40	-.17	.15	-.13	-.17	.05	.23	-.17	-.05	-.14	-.17
8. Secretariat members selected on merit	-.01	-.14	.05	-.00	-.30	.02	.05	-.11	-.14	-.02	.08
9. States to decide Charter by self	.11	.29	-.25	-.04	.04	-.01	.12	.14	-.12	-.06	-.14
10. To follow "national interest" generally at U.N.	.26	.28	-.09	-.09	.01	.21	.01	-.07	.13	-.07	.08
11. To follow "national interest" over "moral values"	.06	-.05	.08	.10	.06	-.05	-.02	.25	-.20	-.12	.13

TABLE IV (continued)

SEES (Agrees)	Factor I High Development	Factor II Authoritarian	Factor III Close U.S. Relations	Factor IV Is Big	Factor V One Party Mobilized	Factor VI Low Density	Factor VII High Growth Rate	Factor VIII Racial Heterogeneity	Factor IX Low Distance from U.S.	Factor X High U.S. Pay	Factor XI High Distance USSR and China
1. U.N. creating less nationalism in persons	-.06	-.02	-.01	-.11	-.01	.06	-.10	.14	-.09	-.05	.11
2. As doubtful that U.N. will evolve into world government	.04	-.06	.02	.05	.06	-.02	-.00	.1?	-.22	-.02	.11
3. Suppression of national interests as benefit to U.N.	-.28	-.03	-.14	.03	-.22	.01	.22	.20	.03	.09	-.07
4. Secretariat rising above national interests	-.00	-.06	.02	-.15	-.06	-.02	-.09	.18	-.01	-.15	-.04
5. U.N. as reducing conflict in world	-.07	-.00	.03	-.14	-.01	.25	-.15	-.13	.02	-.06	.01
6. U.N. as little use in large scale conflict	.00	.25	-.09	.04	-.01	.09	.09	.03	-.00	-.07	-.06
7. U.N. Having more influence 5 to 10 years ago	-.06	-.05	-.04	.09	.30	.19	-.05	-.03	.02	-.15	-.03
8. U.N. as capable of solving world problems	-.10	.03	-.11	.08	.03	.30	-.06	-.14	-.13	-.07	-.00
9. States can defy U.N. without status loss	-.09	-.15	.04	-.02	-.26	-.05	.07	.04	-.11	-.07	.15
10. States pay attention to U.N. resolutions	-.27	.04	-.14	.39	-.05	.13	.08	-.03	.05	-.10	.60
11. Moral values as playing large role at U.N.	-.11	-.07	-.19	-.03	-.03	.01	-.05	-.06	.04	-.21	-.11
12. Conflict is normal in international relations	-.19	-.28	.27	-.11	.02	-.14	.01	.01	-.04	-.05	-.25
13. World peace soon as utopian	.25	-.24	-.01	.01	-.20	-.03	.03	.19	-.05	.08	.02
14. State system as outmoded	-.27	-.18	.16	-.34	-.22	-.00	.19	.15	-.08	-.07	-.15

TABLE V

PREDICTORS ORDERED IN TERMS OF THE NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS (.05 level)

	Wishes	Perceptions		Total
Development	6	4	••	10
Authoritarianism	5	2	■	7
U.S. Relations	3	1	■	4
Bigness	2	2	■	4
Party-Mobilization	1	2	■	3
Density	1	2	■	3
Growth Rate	1	0	■	1
Distance	0	1	■	1
Racial	1	0	■	1
U.S. Distance	0	0	▬	0
U.N. Pay	0	0	■	0
	—	—		—
	20	14		34

TABLE VI

POWER OF PREDICTORS IN TERMS OF
FREQUENCY OF SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATIONS

	This Study	National Attribute Study
Development	.40	.54
Authoritarianism	.28	.10
U.S. Relations	.16	.07
Bigness	.16	.10
Party-Mobilization	.12	.20
Density	.12	.16
Growth Rate	.04	.07
Distance	.04	.23
Racial	.04	.05
U.S. Distance	0	.16
U.N. Pay	0	.05

TABLE VII

PREDICTORS ORDERED IN TERMS OF THEIR PURITY AND IMPORTANCE

	Positive		Negative		Total
Development	0	-	10	=	10 (negative)
Authoritarianism	1	-	6	=	5 (negative)
U.S. Relations	3	-	1	=	2 (positive)
Bigness	1	-	3	=	2 (negative)
Party-Mobilization	2	-	1	=	1 (positive)
Growth Rate	1	-	0	=	1 (positive)
Distance	1	-	0	=	1 (positive)
Density	1	-	2	=	1 (negative)
Racial	0	-	1	=	1 (negative)
U.S. Distance	0	-	0	=	0 (neutral)
U.N. Pay	0	-	0	=	0 (neutral)

TABLE VIII

HYPOTHESES SUPPORTED?

Development	Yes
Authoritarianism	Yes
U.S. Relations	Yes
Bigness	Yes
Party-Mobilization	No
Growth Rate	Yes
Distance	Yes
Density	Yes
U.N. Pay	No

TABLE IX

FACTOR I
(7.6% of variance)

Disagree that: It is clear that members of the secretariat, including
the Secretary General, can rise above national and
regional interests to become truly international persons.

(.72) (negative)

Disagree that: If the world is to disarm, it is desirable to give the UN
major responsibility rather than some agency outside of
the UN system.

(.63) (negative)

Disagree that: It seems desirable to give the United Nations some limited
taxing powers.

(.40) (negative)

Disagree that: The United Nations needs to be strengthened in almost all
aspects.

(.40) (negative)

Disagree that: The United Nations environment tends to make a person
less nationalistic.

(.32) (negative)

5 negative

FACTOR II
(5.7% of variance)

Agree that: States apparently can openly defy the United Nations with
little loss of international status.

(.78) (negative)

TABLE IX (continued)

Agree that: It is generally preferable to pursue one's 'national
interest' instead of 'moral values' if they come in
conflict.

(.48) (negative)

Agree that: It would be desirable to amend the Charter to give the
International Court of Justice absolute compulsory
jurisdiction over certain categories of cases.

(.43) (positive)

2 negative, 1 positive

FACTOR III
(9% of variance)

Disagree that: The national state system in many ways seems outmoded.

(.80) (negative)

Disagree that: It is desirable to place the remaining non-self-governing
territories more firmly under the control of the UN.

(.78) (negative)

Disagree that: It would be desirable to amend the Charter to give the
International Court of Justice absolute compulsory juris-
diction over certain categories of cases.

(.50) (negative)

Disagree that: Suppressing the quest to achieve "national interests" would
generally benefit the United Nations.

(.44) (negative)

Agree that: It is generally preferable to pursue one's "national
interest" instead of 'moral values' if they come in conflict.

(.44) (negative)

TABLE IX (continued)

Agree that: States should generally follow their 'national interest' as they pursue policies at the UN.

(.36) (negative)

Disagree that: It seems desirable to give the United Nations some limited taxing powers.

(.30) (negative)

7 negative

FACTOR IV
(6.4% of variance)

Disagree that: Each member state should decide itself, in terms of its interests, the meaning of the Charter.

(.77) (positive)

Disagree that: The United Nations environment tends to make a person less nationalistic.

(.53) (negative)

Disagree that: States should generally follow their 'national interest' as they pursue policies at the UN.

(.46) (positive)

Disagree that: It is generally preferable to pursue one's 'national interest" instead of "moral values' if they come in conflict.

(.41) (positive)

Disagree that: Conflict seems to be the 'normal' state of affairs in international relations.

(.31) (positive)

TABLE IX (continued)

Agree that: It seems desirable to give the United Nations some

limited taxing powers.

(.31) (positive)

Agree that: Advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice

should be respected almost as if they were decisions.

(.30) (positive)

6 positive, 1 negative

FACTOR V
(5.6% of variance)

Disagree that: If large scale war were to occur between the major powers

the United Nations would be of little use in controlling

the conflict.

(.75) (positive)

Agree that: Members of the Secretariat should be selected solely on

merit (no geographic considerations).

(.72) (positive)

Agree that: Suppressing the quest to achieve 'national interests"

would generally benefit the United Nations.

(.38) (positive)

3 positive

FACTOR VI
(8.6% of variance)

Agree that: Moral values do play a large role in the activities at

the United Nations.

(.80) (positive)

TABLE IX (continued)

Agree that: States should generally follow their "national Interest" as they pursue policies at the UN.

(.58) (negative)

Agree that: Most states pay careful attention to United Nations Resolutions in formulating their policies.

(.57) (positive)

Agree that: It seems desirable to give the United Nations some limited taxing powers.

(.52) (positive)

Disagree that: Suppressing the quest to achieve "national interests" would generally benefit the United Nations.

(.46) (negative)

Agree that: The United Nations seems to have contributed significantly to reducing conflict in the modern world.

(.41) (positive)

4 positive, 2 negative

FACTOR VII
(7.3% of variance)

Disagree that: The United Nations seems to have more influence on world affairs than it did 5 to 10 years ago.

(.77) (negative)

Disagree that: There are few international problems that the UN is not capable of solving if a real effort is made to use its facilities.

(.76) (negative)

TABLE IX (continued)

Disagree that: It is desirable to give the United Nations, under

suitable conditions, a permanent international

military force.

(.43) (negative)

Disagree that: The United Nations needs to be strengthened in almost

all aspects.

(.41) (negative)

Disagree that: The United Nations environment tends to make a person

less nationalistic.

(.34) (negative)

5 negative

FACTOR VIII
(7.5% of variance)

Agree that: Conflict seems to be the "normal" state of affairs in

international relations.

(.78) (negative)

Agree that: Advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice

should be respected almost as if they were decisions.

(.63) (positive)

Agree that It is desirable to give the United Nations, under

suitable conditions, a permanent international military

force.

(.56) (positive)

Agree that: It would be desirable to amend the Charter to give the

International Court of Justice absolute compulsory juris-

diction over certain categories of cases.

(.38) (positive)

TABLE IX (continued)

1 negative, 3 positive

FACTOR IX
(5.5% of variance)

Agree that: To expect 'world peace' in the near future, in the
               sense of man living harmoniously and cooperatively with
               man, is basically utopian.
               (.70) (negative)   M = 12.0

Disagree that: The United Nations needs to be strengthened in almost
               all aspects.
               (.46) (negative)   M = 2.9

Disagree that: The United Nations seems to have contributed significantly
               to reducing conflict in the modern world.
               (.44) (negative)   M = 4.2

3 negative

FACTOR X
(3.9% of variance)

Disagree that: It is very doubtful the United Nations will evolve into
               a World Government.
               (.87) (positive)   M = 5.5

1 positive

Loadings are given in brackets, i.e., ( ). The phrases 'agree that'
and "disagree that" indicate the kind of deviation from the mean value,
toward either the agree or disagree side of the answer line, which moves
a respondent up the factor dimension.

TABLE X

Factor I	Negative	(5 to 0)
Factor II	Negative	(2 to 1)
Factor III	Negative	(7 to 0)
Factor IV	Positive	(6 to 1)
Factor V	Positive	(3 to 0)
Factor VI	Positive	(4 to 2)
Factor VII	Negative	(5 to 0)
Factor VIII	Positive	(3 to 1)
Factor IX	Negative	(3 to 0)
Factor X	Positive	(1 to 0)

TABLE XI

CANONICAL CORRELATION

Independent Factors		Weights		Dependent Factors		Weights	
I	=	.463	(Development)	I	=	.221	(negative)
II	=	.536	(Authoritarianism)	II	=	-.277	(negative)
III	=	-.353	(U.S. Relations)	III	=	.650	(negative)
IV	=	.325	(Bigness)	IV	=	-.257	(positive)
V	=	.239	(Party-Mobilization)	V	=	.063	(positive)
VI	=	.196	(Density)	VI	=	-.010	(positive)
VII	=	-.239	(Growth Rate)	VII	=	-.104	(negative)
VIII	=	.053	(Racial)	VIII	=	-.596	(positive)
IX	=	.055	(U.S. Distance)	IX	=	.119	(negative)
X	=	.108	(U.N. Pay)	X	=	.029	(positive)
XI	=	.246	(Distance)	XI			

Canonical Correlation = .80

TABLE XII

IF

II (.53)
Undemocratic — High — Democratic

I (.46)
Developed — High — Underdeveloped

III (-.35)
Close U.S. Relations — Low — Far U.S. Relations

IV (.32)
Bigness — High — Smallness

THEN

III (.65)
Negative — High — Positive

VIII (-.59)
Positive — Low — Negative

II (-.27)
Negative — Low — Positive

IV (-.25)
Positive — Low — Negative

I (.22)
Negative — High — Positive

TABLE XIII

CANONICAL CORRELATION OF HEAVIEST WEIGHTED
VARIABLES OF PREVIOUS ANALYSIS

Independent Factors			Dependent Factors		
I	.52	(Development)	I	.25	(negative)
II	.62	(Authoritarianism)	II	-.24	(negative)
III	-.38	(U.S. Relations)	III	.62	(negative)
IV	.33	(Bigness)	IV	-.33	(positive)
			VIII	-.64	(positive)

FOOTNOTES

[1]I would like to thank the Research Advisory Committee of Central Michigan University for its financial support of the data gathering phase of the project; the Political Science Department of Florida Atlantic University for financial support of the data analysis phase; and, the vote of the Florida Atlantic University Research Committee to support the project out of NSF Institutional Grant monies.

[2]Jack E. Vincent, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (1968), pp. 916-931.

[3]Richard F. Pederson, "National Representation in the United Nations," International Organization, Vol. 15 (1961), p. 258. Along these same lines, particularly in respect to certain representatives, Keohane has maintained: "Furthermore, some representatives of small and new states have more freedom of action than delegates from large entities, particularly since they are less closely instructed by their foreign offices. In specific terms, this means that the policies of certain African and Asian states may be influenced heavily by what their representatives think." (Robert Owens Keohane, "Political Influence in the General Assembly," International Conciliation, No. 557 (1966), p. 37)

[4]Other literature stressing delegate influence includes: H. G. Nicholas, The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method, (New York: MacMillan, 1954), p. 84; H. G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 88-122; Sydney D. Bailey, The General Assembly of the United Nations, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 8-18; Gary Best, Diplomacy in the United Nations, (Northwestern University, 1960, unpublished dissertation); and Keohane, op. cit.

[5]In the model, exposition is facilitated by the introduction of the concept of "cause" and/or "influence." I have never been convinced that these are necessary concepts as far as theory is concerned. That is, under the concept of "scientific theory," it may not be necessary to speak of "cause" or "influence," when precisely expressing the relationships between variables or testing hypotheses derived from such stated relationships. As an aid to speculative thinking, however, I see no great harm introduced by the inclusion of these admittedly difficult concepts.

[6]From a statistical point of view, then, the instructions should "explain" the delegate behavior in the sense that they can account for observed variance. With delegate and home state cooperation, it would be fairly easy to establish the predictive relevance of "compelling instructions" to "prescribed acts." For example, on a particular issue, instructions might either tell the delegate to vote for it, abstain, or vote against it. Rank scores generated by this three-fold split could then be correlated with actual voting behavior. We would expect, then, a perfect correlation between our instructional rank scores and voting rank scores. Similar scoring systems, of course, could be probably worked out for other kinds of acts to ascertain their relationship to instructions.

[7]Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 218-219.

[8]One can distinguish here between the concept of attitude as something standing behind test performance, revealed by questionnaire responses, but not directly measured, and "questionnaire behavior," which is directly observable. For the sake of the model, attempting to depict possible lines of causal influence, attitudes are treated in the former sense, although, in research, it may not be necessary to deal conceptually with more than "questionnaire behavior." In the latter usage, then, questionnaire behavior is synonymous with a subject's scores on a particular test, not necessarily revealing something beyond the test, i.e., a "hidden" or "partially hidden" attitude.

[9]"Frequency" may be thought of as the number of instructions per unit of time and "magnitude" as the average number of words per set of instructions.

[10]As suggested above, the present project will only probe a sample of what might be considered the universe of delegate attitudes. One obvious path of continued research, then, in this connection, would be to probe new attitudinal areas, possibly in terms of the negative/positive cast adopted in this study. Also, although considerable delegate cooperation would be necessary, the actual dispatches of delegates to the home states might be subjected to content analysis, along negative/positive lines, and, through the proper scoring techniques, such information could be correlated with questionnaire scores. The idea of the chain of influence would greatly be enhanced if those that tend to be "negative" on various questionnaire items tend to send "negative" messages and those who are "positive" tend to send "positive" messages.
    A particularly fruitful line of inquiry, if delegates are amenable, would be to run a wide range of non-genetic personal inventory data, such as rank, age, etc., against gathered questionnaire data. As more and more variables are generated, factor analysis, multiple regression, and canonical correlation techniques might prove to be the most valuable kinds of analytical tools.

[11]The judges were upper division students at Florida Atlantic University with extensive training in international relations.

[12]As will be seen by the correlation technique, it is movement away from the mean value, toward either the "Agree" or "Disagree" side, that defines "negative" and "positive" responses for each respondent on each statement. This approach was considered proper because the original range in every case is from 1 to 21. It should be understood, however, that when the mean falls away from "0," say, strongly to the "agreement" side, a "negative" response is any response located toward the "disagreement" side away from the mean. Technically, then, the term, less agreement, should be applied to responses between the mean and the "0" point (scored 11).

[13]The questionnaire avoided any reference to personal classification information in the hopes of maximizing returns. Questionnaires employed in an earlier study (treated above) which included such items were frequently left partially blank, although responses were given to the non-personal items. The strategic decision to ignore such items in this study in no way implies that such items may not be extremely valuable in interpreting delegate responses.

[14]It is possible that many more of the responding delegates were also Ambassadors. It may be desirable to have as many Ambassadors as possible within the group of responding delegates, but, as the project has been set up, this is not at all necessary. That is, as explained above, the major purpose of the project is to relate non-personal data to delegate response patterns. A delegate's "rank," then, is considered to fall in the same analytical category (personal) as "age," "education," etc. These are potentially fruitful lines of inquiry, but are not pursued here for reasons explained above.

In this connection, in this author's opinion, it would be wrong to believe that the only important persons at the United Nations are Ambassadors. Even though Ambassadors technically run missions, they, like the head of any complicated bureaucratic institution, operate in terms of streams of influence. In short, they are surrounded by other persons who have impact upon outcomes, as well as they, even though the Ambassadors' impact may be "larger" than that of their subordinates. This, however, is an extremely complicated question which needs exploration. A sample limited just to Ambassadors, of course, is a research possibility, but, in view of the fact that Ambassadors make up less than a fourth of the active participants in delegations, the more general delegate population, of which Ambassadors are a part, is viewed as worthy of study and, of course, is the focus of attention in this study.

[15]The categories used in this table were taken from Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross Polity Survey (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1963), pp. 54-117. Thus in the case of size, "Very Large" referred to states falling in the category of two million square miles or above; "Large" referred to states falling in the category of 300,000 to 1.9 million square miles; "Medium" referred to states falling in the category of 75,000 to 299,000 square miles; and "Small" referred to states falling in the category of below 75,000 square miles. The categories used in connection with population, agricultural population, literacy rate, freedom of press, and status of the legislature, are fully explained in Banks and Textor. The geographic groupings are based upon delineations indicated by Banks and Textor.

[16]Hans L. Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1963), pp. 54-55.

A true random sample is extremely difficult to obtain with this population. If a sample of, say, 40 delegates is drawn and personal letters are sent, or interviews arranged, with the 40 persons picked, there is a considerable likelihood of resistance on the part of the

chosen. A delegate is likely to ask: "Why was I picked instead of
someone else?" Anticipating such resistances, this researcher aimed
for the "maximum," that is, to obtain responses from as many delegations
as possible. As indicated above, if it is felt that this may create
a bias, then the researcher is left with a large enough cooperative
group to make descriptive discussions profitable. After all, even if
the associations shown here hold only for the cooperative group of
delegates, nevertheless this is a sizeable part of the total delegate
population.

[17] Banks and Textor, op. cit. The rationale for the selection of
variables and the source of the remaining variables is fully treated
in the National Attribute study and will not be repeated here.

[18] The principal component solution was employed. Unities were
placed in the principle diagonal of the correlation matrix and the factor
matrix was rotated, using Kaiser's varimax criterion. The minimum
eigenvalue for which a factor was rotated was 1.0. See Modern Factor
Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Henry F. Kaiser,
"The Varimax Criterion for Analytical Rotation in Factor Analysis,"
Psychometrika, 23 (1958), pp. 187-200; Henry F. Kaiser, "Computer
Program for Varimax Rotation in Factor Analysis," Educational and
Psychological Measurements, Vol. 19 (1959), pp. 413-430; Dean J. Clyde,
Elliott M. Cramer, Richard J. Sharin, Multivariate Statistical Programs
(Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami, 1966), pp. 15-19; Bruce M.
Russett, International Regions in International Integration (Chicago:
Rand, McNally, 1968); Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict
Behavior Within and Between Nations," General Systems, Yearbook for
the Advancement of General Systems Theory (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1963);
Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M. Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems Through
Factor Analysis of A Cross Polity Survey," The American Behavioral
Scientist, Vol. 9 (1965), pp. 3-6; Phillip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks,
"Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of A Cross Polity
Survey," American Political Science Review, Vol. 59 (1965), pp. 602-614;
Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between
Nations, 1958-60," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 10 (1966),
pp. 41-64; R. J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations
1946-1959," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 10 (1966), pp. 65-73;
Jack E. Vincent, Factor Analysis in International Relations: Interpreta-
tion, Problem Areas and An Application (Gainesville: University of
Florida Press, forthcoming); R. J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); Jack E. Vincent, "Factor
Analysis as a Research Tool in International Relations: Some Problem
Areas, Some Suggestions and An Application," Proceedings of the 65th
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (New York,
1969); Raymond B. Cattell, "The Measuring and Strategic Use of Factor
Analysis," in Raymond B. Cattell (ed.), Handbook of Multivariate Experi-
mental Psychology (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Co., 1966), pp. 174-243;
and Raymond B. Cattell, "The Basis of Recognition and Interpretation of
Factors," Educational and Psychological Measurement, Vol. 22 (1962),
pp. 667-695.

[19]Factor scores were calculated using the formula: $F = ZA (A'A)^{-1}$ where F is an N x m matrix of factor scores, Z is an N x n matrix of scores on the original variables in standard score form, A is an n x m matrix of factor coefficients (loadings) and N = subjects, n = variables and m = factors. See John L. Horn and Wilbur C. Miller, "Evidence on Problems in Estimating Common Factor Scores," Educational and Psychological Measurement, Vol. 26 (1966), pp. 617-622; for the advantages of this formula over other possible formulas, such as F = ZA (defined above) or F = ZB where B is an n x m matrix in which unity is substituted for each "salient" coefficient and zero is substituted for every other loading. The most obvious advantage of the formula employed in this study is that it produces truly orthogonal factor scores, whereas the other formulas may not. In this connection, a check correlating each set of factor scores with every other set of factor scores showed them to be truly orthogonal with correlations of .0. See also John L. Horn, "An Empirical Comparison of Methods for Estimating Factor Scores," Educational and Psychological Measurement, Vol. 25 (1965), pp. 313-321, and Gene V. Glass and Thomas O. Maguire, "Abuses of Factor Scores," American Educational Research Journal, Vol. 3 (1966), pp. 297-304.

[20]Alker and Russett, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

[21]In fact, the factor scores of the "Development" dimension correlate -.37 with this item and these variables correlate with it -.38, -.35 and -.31, respectively.

[22]The "reasons" which follow are offered as possible influences which may help account for the relationships discovered and should not be seen as offered as the explanation. In each case, they should be considered prefaced by the phrase, "other things being equal." Also, it should be clear that "positive" here refers to both wishes and perceptions. The mixing of "normative" and "perceptual" items frequently occurs in attitudinal scales, such as the "Dogmatism Scale," which is assumed to tap a general orientation, i.e., "The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common" (perceptual), "It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward" (normative). Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960), pp. 73-76. Interestingly, in the National Attribute study, negative perceptions toward organs were frequently associated with negative wishes toward organs (called "desires" in that study). I suspect, but cannot prove, that if a delegate informs me, and means it, that "states can openly defy the United Nations with little loss of international status" that he may behave differently, and in a way less supportive of the U.N., than a delegate who disagrees with such an item. The same reasoning applies in the case of other perceptual items. In short, negative perceptions may have negative behavioral connotations and, of course, this is assumed in the case of "negative wishes." These propensities, however, are very hard to substantiate. The whole area of the actual relationship between "questionnaire behavior" and "real behavior," of course, has not been settled, even for widely used questionnaires.

[23]Jack E. Vincent, The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations: An Examination of Their Attitudes Toward the Organization, (Stillwater: Oklahoma State University Press, 1965).

[24]Ibid., p. 44.

[25]Ibid., p. 138.

[26]Digest of "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations," in World Affairs Digest, (Oshkosh, Wisconsin: Wisconsin State University Press, 1968).

[27]See: Abraham F. I. Shihata, "The Attitude of New States Toward the International Court of Justice," International Organization, Vol. 14 (1965), pp. 203-222; and Francis O. Wilcox, UN and the Nonaligned Nations, (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1962), p. 54. Shihata argues in connection with the International Court of Justice that "The record shows that some new states have adopted an attitude more favorable to the Court than that adopted by many older nations." (p. 222). Wilcox develops arguments similar to those presented above but focusses on the "need" of "nonaligned nations" for the United Nations. Khalid I. Babaa also sees a number of reasons (i.e., protection, dignity) why the "nonaligned" should view the United Nations in favorable terms. "The 'Third Force' and the United Nations," The Annals, Vol. 362 (November, 1965), pp. 81-91. John Karefa-Smart has maintained "...even though the Charter was written and adopted while most of the African states were still colonial territories, the Africans none the less hold the Charter of the United Nations in the highest esteem." John Karefa-Smart, "Africa and the United Nations," International Organization, Vol. 19 (1965), p. 766.

[28]In spite of the fact that such a refusal might reasonably be seen as evidence of a "negative" orientation, nevertheless, as will be seen, "U.N. Pay," as such, has no "significant" explanatory power in respect to the questionnaire.

[29]Although such support might reasonably be seen as evidence of a "positive" orientation, at this juncture, an argument will be developed later that suggests good reasons to distinguish between "financial" and "attitudinal" support. Also, the United States, because of its obvious traditional support of the United Nations, might be seen as an "exception" to supposed effect of economic development on delegate attitudes. Perhaps an overriding "idealism," deeply embedded in cultural elements, tends to act as a counterforce. Impressionalistically, however, it seems that the U.S. commitment to the United Nations is somewhat less than it was prior to the recent entry into the United Nations of a number of underdeveloped states, many of which are openly critical of U.S. policies, frequently in the name of United Nations Principles. In any case, the discussion of this variable, like the others, should be considered prefaced by the phrase, "other things being equal."

[30]Ordinarily the variable of "U.N. Pay" and "Development" should correlate strongly and therefore they should load on the same factor dimension. The year the data were collected, however, was a year when many states, both developed and underdeveloped, were balking at paying their assessments. As the factor analysis shows, the subject order of those that did pay was basically unrelated to the subject order on the variables loading heavily on the "Development" dimension. This peculiar circumstance gives rise to the above prediction. In ordinary times, then, United Nations payments would be "submerged" in the "Development" dimension which would be assumed to predict "negative responses."

[31]Vincent "National Attributes . . . . " op. cit., p. 930.

[32]All significant correlations have been underlined using a two-tailed test. Because N is the same in every case, all correlations greater than $+$ .25 are significant at the .05 level or less, and all correlations $+$ .32 or above are significant at the .01 level or less. The generalizations that follow, then, are based upon these levels of significance. That is, every relationship is significant either at the .05 level or less. If the exact level is of interest, then it may be ascertained by reference to the table to see whether the correlation lies between $+$ .25 and $+$ .31, or is greater than $+$ .32. If, because the direction of correlation has been predicted, a one-tailed test is deemed acceptable, those correlations, where the prediction was borne out, have significance levels of .50 of the indicated value. Thus, a correlation of $+$ .25 is significant at the .025 level, using a one-tailed test.

The whole problem of significance in this study might be approached by imagining two hats, each with numbers running from 1 to 65. One hat might be seen as "representing" the predictors and the other the items. If we were to draw numbers from one of the hats, one at a time, and place them in the order they came out of the hat, and then do the same for the other hat, we would expect the two orders to correlate as high as $+$ .25 only 5% of the time and $+$ .32 only 1% of the time.

[33]This table also allows us to see how much better a predictor does than chance expectations, if purely random responses to the items are assumed. Thus, if 65 delegates randomly responded to 100 items, we would expect that any random order of numbers, running from 1 to 65, would correlate at the $+$ .25 level 5% of the time with such items. Any predictor with an index exceeding .05, then, exceeds chance expectations at the .05 level.

[34]An additional possibility is to run in multiple regression analysis of independent factors against each of the dependent factors taken individually. This analysis would produce statements such as, "The higher a respondent's home state is on the Development Factor and Authoritarianism Factor, but the lower it is on the Density Factor, the higher the respondent tends to score on questionnaire Factor I." The advantage of this technique is to increase the size of the correlations, and therefore the accuracy of predictions by considering numerous independent

variables, but the disadvantage is in the problem of assessing the
overall importance of the predictors because the weights assigned to
the predictors may vary and probably will vary from dependent variable
to dependent variable (also verified).

See the following for a discussion of the canonical technique:
Harold Hotelling, "Relations Between Two Sets of Variates," Biometrika,
Vol. 28 (1936), pp. 321-377; Harold Hotelling, "The Most Predictable
Criterion," Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. 26 (1953), pp. 139-
142; T. W. Anderson, An Introduction to Multivariate Statistical Analysis
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), Chapter 12; M. S. Bartlett, "The
Statistical Significance of Canonical Correlations," Biometrika, Vol. 32
(1941), pp. 29-38; Paul Horst, Generalized Canonical Correlations and
Their Applications to Experimental Data (Seattle: University of Washington,
1961, mimeographed); Paul Horst, "Relations Among m Sets of Measures,"
Psychometrika, Vol. 26 (1961), pp. 129-149; M. G. Kendall, A Course in
Multivariate Analysis (London: Charles Griffin and Co., 1957), Chapter 5;
G. Thompson, "The Maximum Correlation of Two Weighted Batteries," The
British Journal of Psychology: Statistical Section, Part 1 (1947), pp.
27-34; and Clyde, Cramer and Sharin, op. cit., pp. 4-8.

[35] It might be objected at this point that names should be given to
the resulting factor dimensions. In this connection, Alker and Russett
have argued, "Factors are not born with names but must be christened by
their parents who may not be able to agree on what they should be called."
(Alker and Russett, 1965, p. 36). In fact, factor names may fall short
of describing all of the variables loading most heavily on the factor. A
list of the heaviest loadings, then, makes it clear which are the important
tests involved in producing factor scores. Because the factor analysis
in the case of the dependent variables has been used primarily to produce
a set of orthogonal variables and not to search for "underlying" variables,
the task of assigning appropriate names to each of the dimensions will not
be attempted. For our purposes, then, a label such as Factor I is just
as meaningful as a label such as "realistic idealist." To borrow from
Shakespeare: "A factor with any other name would load as sweet." In the
case of the independent variables, where names were more obvious, they
were "christened." See Vincent, Factor Analysis in International Relations,
op. cit., for a discussion of the distinction between using factor analysis
as a "search for causes" and its "data reduction" usage, as applied above.

[36] Additional canonical correlations can be generated. This is usually
with the restriction that the "new" canonical variate scores must not relate
to the same variance test has been explained by the previously generated
canonical variate scores (on the same "side). Thus, if X_1 is the first set
of canonical variate scores, X_2, the second set, must be orthogonal to X_1 and
X_3 must be orthogonal to X_1 and X_2 and so forth. The same holds of course of
Y, relative to Y_2, etc. Canonical correlations can be extracted as long as
there is variance in common between the two sets of variables. In the present
study all subsequent canonical correlations were significant at less than
the .15 level and thus are not presented although, in some cases, one might
want to examine all of those produced from a purely descriptive viewpoint.

[37] See, in addition to the studies already mentioned, Jack E. Vincent, "The Convergence of Voting and Attitude Patterns at the United Nations," Journal of Politics, Vol. 31 (1969), pp. 952-983; Jack E. Vincent, "An Analysis of Caucusing Group Activity at the United Nations," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 2 (1970), pp. 133-150; Jack E. Vincent, "An Analysis of Attitude Patterns at the United Nations," Quarterly Journal of the Florida Academy of Sciences, Vol. 32 (1969), pp. 185-209; and Jack E. Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly," American Political Science Review (scheduled for 1971).

[38] See Vincent, "The Convergence of Voting and Attitude Patterns ..." op. cit.; Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly," op. cit.; and Jack E. Vincent, "An Examination of Voting Patterns in the 23rd and 24th Sessions of the General Assembly," Research Report No. 54, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1971.

[39] For a full treatment, see the various Dimensionality of Nations Research Reports, in particular, R. J. Rummel, "The DON Project, A Five-Year Research Program," Research Report No. 9, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1967; R. J. Rummel, "Field Theory and Indicators of International Behavior," Research Report No. 29, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1969; David M. McCormick, "A Field Theory of Dynamic International Processes," Research Report No. 30, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1969; R. J. Rummel, "Field and Attribute Theories of National Behavior: Some Mathematical Interrelationships," Research Report No. 31, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1969; Tong-Whan Park, "Asian Conflict in Systematic Perspective: Application of Field Theory (1955 and 1963)," Research Report No. 35, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; R. J. Rummel, "U.S. Foreign Relations: Conflict, Cooperation and Attribute Distances," Research Report No. 41, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; Richard Van Atta and R. J. Rummel, "Testing Field Theory on the 1963 Behavior Space of Nations," Research Report No. 43, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; R. J. Rummel, "Field Theory and the 1963 Behavior Space of Nations," Research Report No. 44, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; Tong-Whan Park, "Measuring Dynamic Patterns of Development: The Case of Asia, 1949-1968," Research Report No. 45, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; R. J. Rummel, "Indicators of Cross National and International Patterns," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 (1969), pp. 127-147; R. J. Rummel, "International Pattern and Nation Profile Delineation," in Davis B. Bobrow and Judah L. Schwartz, Computers and the Policy-Making Community (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 154-202; and R. J. Rummel, "Some Attributes and Behavioral Patterns of Nations," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 2 (1967), pp. 196-206.

[40] R. J. Rummel, "The DON Project, A Five-Year Research Program," op. cit., p. 35.

[41]Rummel, "Field and Attribute Theories of National Behavior..."
op. cit., p. 6.

[42]Ibid., p. 16.

[43]Ibid., p. 7.

[44]Ibid., p. 22.

[45]That is, without an error term.

[46]Rummel, "Field Theory and Indicators of International Behavior,"
op. cit., p. 10.

[47]The above argument, of course, could be used to attack any study
which attempts falsification of the primary notion expressed by the equation,
that is, that all of the variation of B-space can be accounted for by
variation in A-space.

[48]This is assuming that agreement can be generated on what constitutes
a "test." The "basis problem"--when do we have a basis of A-space?--seems
very difficult to answer. As pointed out above, any study that does
"poorly," in the sense that all of the variations in the basis of B-space
is not accounted for by variation in the basis of A-space may be the result
of an "inadequate" basis for A-space. In this connection, factor analysis,
as presently employed, only gives an approximation of a basis for either
space because of the decision to use the 1.0 eigenvalue cut-off. The
factor dimension, then, cannot reproduce any variable in the analysis with
a communality of less than 1.0 (almost all variables will have communalities
of less than 1.0 using the 1.0 eigenvalue decision). In view of this, it
would be technically more correct, in the Social Field Theory and
Attribute literature, to speak of a quasi-basis or basis approximation
in actual applications. In connection with this point see Vincent,
Factor Analysis in International Relations, op. cit.

[49]If similar findings to the above continue, that is, the discovery
that a subspace of B-space is well accounted for by a sub-space of A-space
but that substantial portions of A-space are unrelated to B-space, it
may be that a reformulation of Attribute or Social Field Theories, along
these lines, may be in order. Under this reformulation, we would not
expect all of the variation in the basis of B-space to be accounted for
by variation in the basis of A-space but only a portion thereof. The
focus would then be on the kinds of behavior (i.e., trade, etc.) that is
related (using, perhaps, a deterministic model) to kinds of attributes
or distances (Development, U.S. Relations, etc.). That is, in this latter
formulation, Attribute and Social Field Theories would become partial
theories, as opposed to general theories, of international behavior.
In this connection, I have already pointed out that Social Field Theory
may already be "partial" because of its focus on dyadic relations. In
the new formulation, if it is made, it would become partial to a kind
of dyadic relation. Under the version of Attribute Theory, discussed
above, it would also become "partial," relating to certain kinds of
behavior, whether viewed as dyadic or not.